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INTRODUCTION
There are literally hundreds of articles and books on the issue of refugee
repatriation and reintegration. (See the bibliography.) To my surprise, I could not find
one article that focused directly on the issue of either the impact of peace agreements on
refugee repatriation and reintegration (rr&r) or the impact of rr&r on the formulation and
implementation of peace agreements.1 This assessment includes the most detailed and
best case study of refugee repatriation to date, the North/Simmons (1999) volume on
Guatemalan refugee repatriation. 2 To be fair, some articles and books refer to the issue,
but the connection is not analyzed.
                                                
1 Originally, the problem I was assigned was termed the issue of refugee resettlement during the
implementation of a peace agreement. However, in the technical language of refugee studies, refugee
settlement (cf. UNHCR 1995) refers to the temporary or quasi permanent settlement of refugees in
countries of first asylum. Refugee resettlement is used generally with respect to moving refugees to third
countries, most frequently the major countries of immigration. In order not to confuse refugee return to
their home countries with refugee resettlement to countries of asylum, the problem is referred to as
“refugee return,” or “refugee repatriation” when dealing with displaced persons from cross-border
conflicts. “Refugee reintegration” is used when the issue encompasses more than just getting the refugees
back to their home or homeland. For some authors, “repatriation” connotes organized return from above,
while “return”  “gives priority to the views, aspirations, and actions of the refugees and others who work ‘at
the base’ in civil society to build peace, democracy, and human rights.” (North and Simmons 1999, 6) In
reviewing the literature, I find no justification for the distinction, and have used ‘repatriation’ and ‘return’
interchangeably, while noting the centrality of the issue of the control of the process. Similarly, the
suggestion is made that “reintegration” connotes assimilation into “the status quo ante” (North/Simmons
1999, 6). Though there is more justification for this implication than the distinction between repatriation
and return, there is no other term readily available to refer to the process that occurs after the return stage.
In fact, North and Simmons themselves end up distinguishing transformative reintegration from status quo
reintegration, as much as they believe the term ‘reintegration’ connotes only return to the status quo.
2 The North/Simmons 1999 volume, for example, focuses on the problems of Guatemalan refugee
repatriation and the impact on and of political and human rights practices. They do write that, “although
Guatemala’s peace accords addressed some land issues, comprehensive agrarian reform was not
contemplated.” (1999b, 15) In effect, the peace accords undercut the possibility of transformative
reintegration. Further, unlike virtually all other discussions of the relationship, they do attempt some
explanation by attributing the rejection of agrarian reform sometimes to neoliberal ideology (1999b, 15)
and at other times to entrenched economic and power interests supported by the military. Though these and
other ‘explanations’ are not incompatible, since structural adjustment, as the authors contend, seemed to
reinforce entrenched power, they beg the question. For there is no analysis of why the refugees, who were
intent on the conjunction of return and transformation, accepted the exclusion of land reform as part of the
peace agreement but, at the same time, agreed to return. By implication, the insecurity of remaining in
Mexico seemed to outweigh the degree of insecurity that faced the refugees upon return, especially when
they were promised land if and when they returned. When the equation was reversed, especially when
Mexico granted residency status in 1996, and the land promised did not materialize, the flow back dried up.
2The absence of such analysis is doubly surprising since it is part of conventional
wisdom of most writers on the refugee issue that there is a necessary connection between
forging and implementing a peace agreement and ensuring the return and reintegration of
refugees. Peace depends on the successful repatriation and reintegration of refugees, and
every peace agreement must provide for rr&r, or so it is widely believed. (UNHCR
1989b; Suhrke and Zolberg 1989; Zolberg et al 1989; UNHCR and UNDP 1990;
UNHCR 1992; Espiell et al 1999)
For example, in the late 1980s, the Esquipulas Accords3 claimed that there would
be, “no lasting peace without initiatives to resolve the problems of refugees, returnees
and other displaced persons.” (Ferris 1991) Just over ten years later, in the African
context, the intimate connection between peace accords and rr&r was reiterated, but with
a slight twist. Rr&r were said to be signs that peace was in process.
Distinctions between four positions (what I will call Soft, Soft, Hard¬ and
Hard­) on the relationship of implementing peace agreements to the repatriation of
refugees may be helpful. There is a difference between the view that refugee repatriation
is a sign of the movement towards peace and the conviction that there is a necessary
connection between refugee repatriation and peace. The first espouses a soft connection.
The second espouses a hard connection between peace and repatriation. The former is
exemplified by the following: “The return and reintegration of people who have been
uprooted or affected by violence is an important manifestation of the process whereby
national protection is restored and human security reinforced.” (Crisp 1999b, 3)
But this position (which I have labeled Soft) must be distinguished between an
even softer position (Soft). In Soft, the issue of rr&r is a manifestation of peace. In
Soft, resolving the refugee issue, however it is solved, is a manifestation of peace;
refugees need not be repatriated and reintegrated. Thus, in Soft, the issue of rr&r must
be addressed in a peace agreement. In Soft, only the resolution of the refugee issue
needs to be addressed in a peace agreement.
However, the hard view remains the overwhelming conviction and presupposition
of those who connect refugee repatriation to the implementation of peace agreements.
Resolving the refugee and displaced persons issue appears to be a core element in the
terms and successful implementation of a peace agreement. As one scholar summarized
the belief:
One of the goals of modern peace accords is to create a stable environment for the return
of refugees. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has identified
the following dangers, problems and uncertainties which must (my italics) be addressed
in order to facilitate the repatriations (sic!) process: Physical security; social and
psychological security; legal security; and material security. [UNHCR 1997] Ideally a
peace accord should address each of these problem areas. (Watkin 1998, 120)
                                                
3 More properly, the Esquipalas Accords of 7 August 1987, formally titled, Procedure for the
Establishment of a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America.
3The hard relationship between peace agreements and rr&r can be disaggregated
into two different positions: hard¬ an hard­. In hard¬, peace and refugee repatriation
are necessary conditions of one another. In hard­, they are viewed not only as necessary
conditions of one another, but causes of the other happening. That is, refugee repatriation
and reintegration are not only necessary conditions of peace; they help bring about that
peace. On the other hand, peace is not only a necessary condition of rr&r, but is a cause
of rr&r.
Soft
1. Resolving the refugee issue is a sign that peace is really in place.
2. In a proper peace accord, the refugee issue must be addressed.
Soft 
3. Successful rr&r is a sign that peace is really in place.
4. Hence, the issue of rr&r must be addressed in a proper peace accord.
Hard¬
5. Unless there is rr&r, there will be no lasting peace.
6. Peace is a necessary precondition for successful rr&r.
Hard­
7. Refugee repatriation alone is an essential element in the social construction of peace.4
8. Peace is a cause of successful refugee repatriation.
I, personally, have studied refugee issues for many years and written extensively
on the subject. I always assumed that there could be no real peace without dealing with
the refugee issue. My studies of Palestinian refugees, however, did not lead me to believe
that refugee repatriation and reintegration necessarily had to be a part of a peace
agreement. The refugee issue, however, could not be ignored. There would be no
permanent peace unless the refugee issue was addressed as part of the peace agreement.
I have clearly been an extreme softy (Soft) on the relationship between peace
and refugee repatriation. The most important reason could be drawn from the Palestinian
and other cases. If a solution were not found for the refugee issue, there would be a good
chance that refugees would evolve into refugee warriors, perpetuating a cycle of violence.
(cf. Zolberg et al 1989; Khiddu-Makubuya 1994; UNHCR 1995; Gibney et al 1996;
Adelman 1998b) If the refugee issue is not resolved successfully, the refugees may resort
                                                
4 Stepputat (1999) argues that the Guatemalan refugee repatriation, “has been demonstrated to have
contributed to the social construction of peace and the development of a ‘common discursive framework’
which includes the extension of a network of modern rationalities through which techniques of government
work.”  (223-224) He furthermore argues that repatriation is crucial to the reconstruction of civil society as
well. On the other hand, Lovell (De Villa nd Lovell 1999) argues that that long-term permanent peace is
jeopardized by the failure to provide for extensive land reform in the peace agreement. “The fundamental
issue of unequal ownership of land, however, can be resolved only if it is actually addressed. If it is not,
then the peace that has supposedly been signed into being in Guatemala may prove neither firm nor
lasting.” (p. 54) It is not the refugee repatriation, but the conditions for repatriation, that ensure long term
peace according to Lovell. This is even a harder position than Hard­ depicted above.
4to violence directed at their former enemies and/or the government. At the very least,
they often resort to violent criminal activity. For example, in the Lebanese civil war,
refugees, and later the displaced, were the source of recruits for the militias that
destabilized the state. “The strongest militias recruited their members from among the
refugee peoples who were themselves the product of the Lebanese Civil War and other
Middle Eastern wars.” (Beyhun 1994, 16) This was also true of the disaffected and
unemployed youth in Somalia. Similarly, in Bosnia, refugees, supported by the respective
receiving states, were recruited and mobilized into military units. (Lischer 1999) But the
connection between peace and repatriation meant that the refugee problem had to be
addressed, not that the refugees had to be repatriated.
This paper provides evidence that the hard positions (either ¬ or ­) are not
supported by empirical facts. Rr&r are neither necessary nor causal conditions of peace.
Peace is neither a necessary nor a causal condition of successful rr&r, however counter-
intuitive that may first appear. Even the Soft position is not supported by the evidence.
This does not mean that rr&r cannot be an important aspect of some peace processes and,
in fact, serve as signs that peace is in process. But peace may be in process without rr&r.
Rr&r need not even be a manifestation of peace.
However, this chapter makes the claim that even my former Soft position is
incorrect. A peace agreement need not even address the refugee issue.5 Further, however
horrifying this may appear to we refugee scholars, there can be peace without the refugee
issue even being addressed. It may be that the refugee issue cannot be left in limbo
otherwise refugee warriors will develop. But as long as the refugee issue is solved one
way or another, sometimes quite independently of the peace agreement, the refugee issue
need not even be addressed in a peace agreement.
This descriptive conclusion impacts on the issue of whether refugee repatriation,
or even just the refugee issue, should be addressed in peace agreements. That the issue
should be addressed is an assumption probably shared by the organizers6 of a broad
ranging comparative study on “Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars” for
which this study was commissioned.7 This paper will raise the question of the
relationship of rr&r to peace agreements. It will also ask whether provision for refugee
repatriation (and reintegration), or even just the resolution of the refugee problem,
however it can be solved, need necessarily be part of peace agreements.
                                                
5 This deconstruction of the supposed link between peace agreements and repatriation parallels the
deconstruction of the link between repatriation and development that Gasarasi (1996) performed.
6 This study is part of a joint project between the Center for International Security and Cooperation
(CISAC) at Stanford University and the International Peace Academy (IPA). The co-ordinators of the study
are Elizabeth Cousens, Director of Research at IPA, Stephen John Stedman, a senior Researcher at CISAC,
and Professor Donald Rothchild of the University of California at Davis.
7 The study team included 31 scholars (some performing double duty) as well as a number of practitioner
commentators. The study originally included 18 case studies of civil wars and 17 papers on thematic issues
of which the refugee repatriation and reintegration issue was one. Since peace and war rather than refugee
issues were the principle concerns of the organizers, the original topic assigned was called resettlement of
refugees, a term usually reserved in the technical vocabulary of refugee studies to settling refugees in third
countries remote from the civil war.
5PART I - PRELIMINARIES
Basis for this Study
In addition to analyzing the 15 case studies of civil wars and the peace agreements
related to them, as well as the intimate knowledge I myself have of three of them, I also
read an extensive number of other papers on refugee repatriation. These included both
general thematic studies as well as studies of specific cases, a number of which followed
the cessation of hostilities in other regions than those covered by the case studies of the
project.8 In addition, I have had the input both of practitioners who have read and
commented upon previous drafts of this paper as well as of the case study and thematic
authors who were part of the overall project.
This paper has been through three major redrafts. They were not merely rewritten
and edited versions of earlier drafts, but complete reconceptualizations based on the
knowledge and inputs on the earlier drafts and the draft versions of the case studies. The
results are the product of the intercourse between two closely related fields – conflict and
refugee studies within the field of international studies.
Definitions
Refugees, as used here, are defined as persons who cross the border of the country
in which they normally reside because of either persecution (as defined in the refugee
convention) or, more broadly, to escape the perceived threat of violence from a conflict
underway. 9 Displaced persons flee their homes for the same reason, but do not cross an
                                                
8 Niger 1970-71, Bangladesh 1971-72, Sudan after 1977, Guinea Bissau 1975-77, Zaire 1978, Zimbabwe
1980, etc.
9 In ordinary language, virtually anyone displaced, inside or outside the political borders, is generally
referred to as a refugee. However, according to Article I of the Refugee Convention, only those with a well-
founded fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular group, or
political opinion who have crossed an international border are “genuine” refugees. (Goodwin-Gill 1996)
On the other hand, from the political science literature, and for most observers, the convention definition is
far too narrow. Most refugees are simply those who flee violent conflict and cross an international border.
(Zolberg et al 1989) These are generally referred to as Humanitarian as distinct from Convention Refugees.
The application of the Convention Definition in policy and case law has created a huge literature in its own
right related to both the objective and subjective factors (the perceptions of risk). Are these to be assessed
only with reference to the past or also with respect to the future or only the future? With respect to the
objective factors, must those fears be ‘well-founded’, generally referring to the assessment of the risk to a
particular individual of persecution on return? (Cf. Carlier et al 1997) Implicit in such references are issues
of human rights. But are cases of forced abortion (China) and forced female circumcision “persecution”?
Should refugee law be subsumed under human rights law? (Hathaway and Dent 1995) Further, there are
enormous numbers of procedural issues - wherein lies the burden of proof and to what standard - the
claimant establishing the proof, the balance of probabilities or the benefit of doubt given to the claimant -
and who and under what circumstances is the assessment to be made? How are the grounds to be
interpreted? I only hint at the vast number of issues within the legal definition alone, which is inherently
narrow relative to the whole problem, to indicate why a legal definition is of virtually no relevance when
refugee return and peace agreements are the issue. Further, the humanitarian definition itself could be
considered too narrow once concepts like environmental, developmental and economic refugees are
6international border. Though displaced persons are discussed in this paper10, this study
focuses on refugees who flee violent conflict and cross an international border11 and,
thus, pose a political problem for neighboring countries and the international community
as well as a humanitarian problem.
Specifying the group of refugees is another problem. In one conflict, say the one
in Rwanda, are the refugees to be defined as Tutsi refugees when referring to those who
left between 1959 and 1966 or Hutu refugees for those who left following the genocide in
1994? In the former case, there were also Hutu who were forced to flee. In the latter case,
some Tutsi also chose to leave Rwanda. Between these two periods, democratically
inclined Hutu had also become refugees. But in the respective cases, Tutsi and Hutu
overwhelmingly predominated. However, in Rwanda currently, referring to its citizens as
“Tutsi” or “Hutu”, even in the past, runs counter to the ideology of the current
government that wants to obliterate Tutsi/Hutu distinctions as an ‘artificial’ source of
conflict. Further, designating the refugees in the exodus of 1994 as “
they fled because they were Hutu. But calling them extremist Rwandese misrepresents
the fact that many innocent people, who honestly believed that they had much to fear
from the victory of the “Tutsi-led and dominated” victors, were among the exodus.
To take another case, refugees from the Old Mandate of Palestine were called
Palestinian refugees, referring to the territory from which they were deprived of their
homes or livelihood, and, therefore, included Jews as well as Arabs. The referent
“Palestinian” refugees by 1960 came to refer only to the Arab refugees (Adelman 1987,
1994a, 1996, 1997b), and in a terminology that helped define their distinctive nationality
in opposition to some pan-Arabists and some Zionists who denied a distinctive
Palestinian identity.
Naming the refugees is a politically loaded exercise12; neutrality is virtually
impossible, but sensitivity is not. This is even more important, of course, in peace
negotiations than in academic scholarship.
                                                                                                                                                
introduced. If one tries to define refugees in terms of “root causes’, does one get into “developmental” and
“environmental” refugees, or even give up on resolving a refugee problem on its own if the root causes are
traced to globalisation and the new economic order? (Richmond 1994) But even some narrower definitions
are far too broad for our purposes. According to the UNRWA definition of a refugee from Palestine,
anyone who lost their home (they may have moved down the block into a cousin’s home) OR means of
livelihood - they may not have been displaced from their home at all, merely from their work - is a refugee.
Some limits must be drawn on who is a refugee - according to when they left, under what circumstances,
and what they have been doing since their departure. On the other hand, “refugee warriors” - those who
cross a border and take up arms against the regime from which they fled - are not defined as refugees by
humanitarian agencies, but are central to the refugee problem in peace agreements.
10 In that regard, I apologize in advance for contributing to the fact that the “issue of displaced persons is
one of the least discussed aspects of the international refugee regime.” (Zahar in Lebow, fn. 58, 38)
11 The definition most closely resembles the one developed in the Zolberg et al now classic study, Escape
from Violence (1989), but excellent discussions of the issue of definition can be found in Melander (1986)
and Carlier (1997).
12 The labeling problem discussed here is quite distinct from the one Roger Zetter undertook. (“ Labelling
Refugees: Forming and Transforming a Bureaucratic Identity,” Journal of Refugee Studies (1991, 4:1, 39-
62) He analyzed conceptual tools and consequences of the use of the term ‘refugee’ rather than the
depiction of which people are refugees.
7`The issue is not only what you call the refugees, but also how you describe them.
In the case of the Guatemalan civil war, the labeling of refugees as subversives stopped
evidently in 1986. This cessation was a factor that made refugee repatriation possible.
There is also sometimes a problem of specifying the country to which or from
which the refugees fled (Burma or Myammar). In the case of Congo-Brazzaville, the
refugees who fled the Congo mostly fled into the Congo - the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, formerly Zaire, and, before Mobutu, the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We
will generally follow the custom of referring to the names used at the time the refugees
fled from or into a territory, but this practice does not help when the refugee flight or
return takes place over a period of one or more country name changes.
Repatriation of refugees entails the return from a host country, either one
neighboring the state from which the refugee fled or a more remote country in which the
refugee received some form of temporary or permanent asylum. The focus, however, is
overwhelmingly on refugees repatriated from neighboring countries whether or not they
live in refugee camps.
Though refugees may return to their homes, repatriation does not necessarily
entail return home but only return to one’s homeland. This is a final bit also an important
distinction to make.
Stages of Repatriation and Reintegration
Repatriation and reintegration can be considered as part of a continuum. Within
the repatriation stage, Preston (1998, 25) distinguishes three following phases: the
preparation for return; the process of return itself; and the reception and arrangements for
integration immediately upon arrival. 13 The most important issue discussed concerning
the preparation phase is the availability of accurate information to allow refugees to
make an informed decision about repatriating. (Koser 1993, 1997)14 The main
contentious issues connected to the process of return are related to whether the
repatriation was or was not voluntary and was or was not organized by the international
community. Other issues concerning the process include its management – the logistical
arrangements for transport and the provision of food and health service and even security
while the refugees are in transit or just when they arrive at their point of destination.
                                                
13 For a more legal discussion of the issue of repatriation, see Hathaway (1997b).
14 In the case of the return in Mozambique, Koser noted, for example, that the information survey of the
refugees conducted by UNHCR was very flawed in not asking when refugees wanted to return, under what
conditions and who should decide whether the time was ripe for return. Further, the response was clearly
different depending on whether people lived in villages, camps or mixed facilities. Koser determined that
the information on conditions of return were inadequate. Further, no account was taken of the different
responses dependent on age and gender of the one surveyed.
8With respect to the third phase, the focus on the arranged conditions immediately upon
arrival distinguishes repatriation from reintegration. 15
Return to one’s homeland is the end of the process of repatriation but the
beginning of the process of refugee reintegration. Reintegration refers to the process of
reestablishing oneself economically, socially and psychologically in safety and dignity
after having been repatriated.16 It is most often linked with the bountiful literature on
refugees and development aid.17 There are mines to clear, homes to be rebuilt, planting to
be restarted, livestock acquired, and sanitation systems and access to markets need to be
re-established. Further, some return to areas in which the conflict continues in spite of
peace elsewhere. There is also the established adage that returnees should not be
privileged in the aid they receive relative to those who did not flee, so development
programs following peace agreements have to take those who did not move as well as
refugees into account.
Material integration is only part of the problem. The returnees must be socially,
politically and psychologically integrated. Though repatriation may be considered to have
been successful merely because the refugees returned, the reintegration may be
unsuccessful.18 Finally, efforts at rehabilitation and reintegration may just be a cover for
the involuntary character of a process of refugee repatriation. 19
With respect to the latter issues, there is the problem of reintegrating exile
cultures acquired when old case-load refugees return. 20 Even refugees who have been
                                                
15 There are political and human rights issues as well as material conditions necessary for successful
reintegration that are often not taken into consideration when the goal is simply repatriation. (Cf. Stein
1992)
16 USCR 1991, UNHCR 1992b and Hansen et al 1993, in their respective studies of Cambodian
repatriation, all argue that only once the overall human security situation is settled, only then does the focus
shift to housing, employment opportunities, health services, sanitation, etc.
17 For example, see Adelman and Sorenson 1994; Black and Koser 1999; Gambari 1995; Gorman, who has
written the most extensively on the topic, 1984, 1987, 1991, 1993a, 1993b, 1994,; Hogg 1996; Lamb
1987b; Macrea 1999; Manz 1988; Preston 1999; Sorenson 1994; and Stein 1991, 1994, 1997. For a general
discussion of the theme, see Crisp (1999) and his analysis of the issue in the context of the reintegration of
refugees in the Great lakes district of Africa.
18 Eastmond and Õjendal 1999, 32, document that this was the case with respect to Khmer returnees.
19 The Danish Refugee Council 1988 study of the repatriation of Tamil refugees made this point. See also
Jambor 1990; Khoa 1990. Many other studies are simply sceptical of the voluntary character of most return
processes. (Vann 1989; Robinson 1991; Ruiz 1994)
20 Culture here refers to modes of social and cognitive processing relative to thought and social action. (Cf.
Kevin Avruch, Culture & Conflict Resolution 1998, Washington: USIP) Culture then is not an established
pattern, but a realm where contending value orientations, perceptions and operational modalities fight for
priority. (Cf. Charles Nuckolls Culture: The Problem That Cannot Be Solved, Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1998) Some authors go further and divide humans into two fundamentally different
cultures, a culture of assent towards the status quo and a culture of suspicion. (David Bronwitch, Politics by
Other Means, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994, 126) Whether psychologically rooted in attitude at
a very deep level or subject to transformative forces, culture seems to embrace both dispositions. On the
one hand, culture refers to a shared view of human nature (Philip E. Divine, Human Diversity and the
Culture wars: A Philosophical Perspective on Contemporary Cultural Conflict, Westport, CT: Praeger,
1996) On the other hand, culture is not fixed but is malleable.
9away for a relatively short duration (under ten years) often acquire new attitudes and
skills as well as new fears that complicate the process of reintegration. (Akol 1987;
Crosby 1999) The acquisition of new skills and principles was particularly true of women
who may learn principles of equality and rights that they may try to apply during their
experience in camps and upon their return. (Crosby 1999) The latter may be a source of
conflict upon return.
Further, the refugees may have endured very different traumas than those who
remained behind. Those with criminal pasts prior to or acquired in the camps must be
separated from the remaining population if they are not to be allowed to terrorise the
returnees as well as the local population. At the other end of the spectrum, the refugees
may be catalysts for social transformation. In response, the local authorities principally
responsible for any reintegration process may limit the political reintegration of the
refugees to restrict the political space in which those returnees can operate.21
Clearly, repatriation and reintegration of refugees are complex rather than simple
problems. Connecting these issues with the implementation of peace agreements
compounds the analysis further. The problem will require paying attention to all the
nuances of the case studies while keeping in mind a number of major thematic issues as
well.
Key Questions
As the project developed, I expanded the original small set of questions to a more
refined and even more specific list.
1.  Were refugees a cause of the civil war?
2.  How many refugees were products of the civil war in both absolute numbers and in
relation to the internally displaced population and the total population of the state?
3.  Did the refugees flow out in different stages?
4. What was the age of the refugee population (not of the individuals within that
population)?
5.  Were refugees a motivation for mediation and/or intervention by outsiders in the civil
war?
6.  Was provision made for the a) repatriation and b) reintegration of refugees in the
peace agreement?
7.  How many refugees repatriated and what proportion of the original population of
refugees were the refugee returnees?
8.  Did any refugees repatriate prior to the signing of the peace agreement, and, if so,
what proportion were they of the returnee refugee population?
9.  Could the agreement itself be said to be a cause of the refugee repatriation?
10. Did the refugees repatriate spontaneously or were they part of an organized return?
11. To what degree was the decision to repatriate (or not) a product of:
a) refugees deciding themselves;
                                                
21 Taylor (1999) claims that the military and elites in Guatemala succeeded in undermining the
transformative programs of the returnees by keeping the population ignorant of the terms of the agreement,
intimidating those who act to defend human rights, and by demonizing the returnees.  (pp. 146-8)
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b) an organization of refugee warriors;
c) host country inducement or coercion;
d) home country inducements or coercion;
e) IGO decisions and/or actions;
f) pressures and inducements by extra-regional states?
12. To what extent did the following factors affect the process of repatriation:
a) prior planning;
b) information made available to the refugees;
c) transportation available to the refugees;
d) security for the refugees i) in transit ii) upon arrival home;
e) health services and food available i) in transit ii) upon arrival home?
13. Did refugees repatriate to homes or just to the home country? To what degree?
14. Did refugees repatriate to areas free of violent conflict, and, if so, was violent conflict
still underway in other parts of the country when the refugees repatriated?
15. In the reintegration phase, to what degree, if any, were the following issues
significant in the success or failure of refugee reintegration:
a) property ownership;
b) employment;
c) psychological factors (e.g. dependency syndrome after living in refugee camps for a
number of years);
d) social factors;
e) cultural factors based on i) knowledge acquired while refugees ii) ideology iii)
ethnicity, and iv) simple suspicion of strangers;
g) legal and human rights factors?22
16. If the implementation of the peace agreement failed, were the issues of refugee
repatriation and reintegration factors in that failure, and, if so, why?
17. If the implementation of the peace agreement was assessed as successful, was the
issue of refugee repatriation and reintegration a factor in that the:
a) refugees were repatriated;
b) refugees were repatriated successfully;
c) refugees were reintegrated;
d) refugees were reintegrated successfully,
and, if any of the above were not factors, why not?
18. To what degree, if any, were the following organizations mandated to take
responsibility for refugee repatriation and reintegration, and to what degree were they
responsible for the success or failure of the refugee repatriation and reintegration process:
a) IGOs;
                                                
22 Arthur Helton, as might be expected from someone who has spent all his life stressing the role of human
rights in refugee protection, argues for the unique role of NGOs in providing human rights protection for
refugee returnees. He emphasized this aspect with respect to the Cambodian refugee repatriation effort.
(1991) However, the failure of human rights protection, and of NGOs in ensuring that protection with
respect to the Khmer returnees, ended up not being a critical factor in deeming the repatriation of 370,000
Cambodian refugees a success.  Helton (1992b) made the same case for the return of 270,000 Myammar
Muslims in Bangladesh. But Asia Watch (1992b) demonstrated how Helton’s human rights hopes turned
into a human rights nightmare when the political and security conditions were not in place. Thus,
repatriation can be successful even when reintegration is not and human rights protection is effectively
ignored.
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b) NGOs;
c) Host states;
d) Home states;
e) Extra-regional states;
f) Refugees themselves;
g) Peacekeepers?
19. Is the type of war a factor in whether refugees repatriated successfully or not?
20. To what extent is the success or failure of refugee repatriation a product of a) security
issues; b) political issues; c) reintegration issues?
21. If the peace agreement was not successfully implemented, to what degree, if any,
were refugees responsible in some way for that failure?
22. What were the consequences for failure in terms of human misery, crime and
violence?
23. From such an analysis, what are the relevant policy strategies that can be learned with
respect to refugee repatriation and reintegration as one set of factors in a peace
agreement?
24. Does the study have anything to contribute to larger or meta-issues in refugee
scholarship beyond peace implementation, such as:
a) refugees as a product of the modernization process;
b) the right to return;
c) state sovereignty versus refugee rights;
d) voluntary repatriation?
PART II – REPATRIATION AND PEACE ACCORDS
The Marginality of Refugee Repatriation to Peace Accords
Of fifteen case studies of civil wars that were part of the project, the draft articles
in almost half of the cases (7) indicated that the refugee issue was totally marginal to the
outcome of the peace agreement. Little attention was paid to the issue of refugee
repatriation in the scholarly case studies of peace implementation with respect to Angola,
El Salvador, Lebanon, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia or Sri Lanka, though the
agreements sometimes made provision for the repatriation of refugees and the
reintegration of all returnees. This contrasts with the optimism concerning the role of
repatriation at the end of the eighties. (Feitsma 1989) At that time (and I believe it is still
the case), repatriation was deemed best solution for most refugees. Further, repatriation
was also seen as critical to achieving peace. The connection between peace and
repatriation was a factor leading to 1992 being declared the year of refugee repatriation.
It is thus no surprise that there is a presumed intimate connection between refugee
repatriation, peace agreements and their implementation.
However, there seems to be no necessary connection between refugee
repatriation, peace agreements and peace. In the Mozambican civil war, a proposal was
made to include repatriation as a major part of the peace agreement; it was rejected in the
peace negotiations. (Cf. Zieck 1997, 362; UNHCR “Report on Mozambique, South
Africa and Malawi, 4-12 February, 1992, note 139.) Yet, Mozambique is considered to
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have been one of the few successful peace agreements to end a civil war. Further, in this
and two other cases – Guatemala 23, and Nicaragua as well as Mozambique – scholars
make clear why refugee repatriation was not essential to the success or failure of the
peace agreement. Many refugees repatriated prior to the signing of the agreement.24
Even after the peace agreement was signed, return depended on implementation of
certain key factors of the agreement, particularly the provision of security. 25 Further, in
the long term, the key factor for many commentators was not the refugee repatriation
itself, but land and political reform. 26
Sometimes refugee repatriation and peace are conjoined. In the case of Namibia,
under the provisions of the peace agreement worked out between 1978-88, all refugees
were to be welcomed back in to the country at specific entry points. In this and two other
of the remaining five cases, where the repatriation was central rather than apparently
marginal to the implementation of a peace agreement, the repatriation was intimately and
directly tied to the success of the election or referendum provided for in the agreement.
Refugee repatriation was not a goal in itself but a means of establishing a legitimate
successor government. This was the case in Cambodia, where subsequent events
subverted the results. It was certainly the case in Namibia. And in Western Sahara, the
determination of the membership of the polity was the central issue in order to determine
who was eligible to vote in the referendum on independence. Sorting out that issue was,
for the longest time, considered a precondition for the return of the refugees.
In only two agreements could the return of refugees in itself be considered a
central issue in the peace agreements. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, refugee repatriation was at
the heart of the agreement. Yet the majority of the refugees were not able to return to
their homes if those homes were located in areas where the returnees would be a
                                                
23 Stepputat (1999) argues that, “Repatriation came to constitute an important element of the peace
negotiations and a central element of international involvement  (my emphasis) in the peace process in
Guatemala, as it did in Central America.” (212) In other words, refugee repatriation becomes an important
issue in peace negotiations, not because repatriation is essential to the achievement of peace, but because
the issue is important to the international interveners.
24 With respect to Guatemala, “Refugees gradually began to return as the peace process evolved. At first
the numbers were small, since those returning were still largely viewed as enemies of the army. Following
the signature of accords between the Permanent Commissions of Guatemalan Refugees in Mexico (known
by the acronym CCPP) and the government of Guatemala in October 1992, the numbers returning
increased, yet the return remained troubled by continuing human rights abuses and scarce evidence of deep
transformations that would assure political freedoms, personal security, economic well-being, and respect
for indigenous cultures.” (North and Simmons 1999b, 4)
25 In Guatemala, “The slow pace of return was due in large part to concerns about the security of the
refugees…The problems faced by refugees wishing to return to their former positions and lands within
cooperative communities applied both to those returning to Petén and those returning to Ixcán. In both
areas the returnees were often met with open hostility and distrust on the part of local military authorities
and other residents.” (Egan 1999, 104)
26 “(T)here are many good reasons for believing that the economic problems of Guatemala and other
Central American countries cannot be solved without first, or at least simultaneously, addressing problems
of equity, social development, and democratization in order to build the peace required for sustainable
economic growth.” (North and Simmons 1999c, 288)
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minority. Yet the peace – in the sense of an absence of resumption of the civil war –
held.
In Rwanda, the war continued after the breakdown in the peace agreement, a
central issue of which was the return of the refugees. Those refugees did repatriate
because of who won and not because of the peace agreement. Further, another even
larger group of refugees (almost one and one-half million) was produced in the renewed
conflict. Separating those refugees from the ex-government forces that controlled them
became the new problem.
The relationship in the studies between repatriation and peace agreements can be
summarized as follows:
Relationship Number of Cases Cases Explanation
Repatriation Marginal 7 Angola None
El Salvador See note below
Lebanon None
Liberia None
Sierra Leone None
Somalia None
Sri Lanka None
Disjunction 3 Guatemala Occurs before
Mozambique   and long after;
Nicaragua Reintegration
rather than
repatriation
critical
Conjoined 3 Cambodia related to
Namibia legitimization
Western of government
        Sahara
Central - not carried out 2 Bosnia reestablish
 - carried out Rwanda multi-ethnicity
Note that only in one case – that of Rwanda – was the issue of refugee repatriation
central to the peace agreement as a goal in itself. Yet in that case, the refugees were
eventually repatriated in spite of the breakdown of the peace agreement. Further, the new
refugees created by that breakdown were themselves repatriated, not by a peace
agreement but because of a new war.
In almost all the cases where the authors by implication and inattention
considered the refugee issue marginal to the success of the peace agreement, no
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explanation was offered for that marginality. Chuck Call’s study of the peace agreement
ending the El Salvador civil war was the exception. He explained the marginality of the
refugee repatriation issue in that case by two factors:
First, many refugees residing legally or illegally in the United States during the war
sought and were able to remain there. Despite highly politicized immigration policies
which denied the vast majority of applicants political asylum during the 1980s, specific
U.S. laws and evolving immigration policies eventually permitted the majority of
Salvadoreans resident in the United States to remain through the peace process. Second,
the majority of the refugees in neighboring states and IDPs within the country were
either repopulated (sic!) or resettled before the end of the conflict. Beginning in the mid-
1990s, for a variety of political, strategic and humanitarian reasons, the government,
FMLN-affiliated non-governmental organizations and international agencies supported
the closing down of camps containing displaced persons and refugees. By 1991 almost
all were closed or nearly empty. Though many of these persons did not return to their
places of origin, they were resettled in places and circumstances which left them fewer
incentives and/or resources to return home after the conflict. In short, most of the
resettlement programs normally seen after the war occurred during the Salvadoran
conflict. (pp. 9-10)
In other words, the refugees did not need to be repatriated either because they
were permanently settled elsewhere or because many had repatriated prior to the signing
of the agreement as had been the case somewhat in three of the other civil wars –
Guatemala, Mozambique and Nicaragua. Therefore, rather than the peace agreement
being a condition of refugee repatriation, some refugee repatriation and the non-
repatriation of most refugees could possibly have been conditions making the
implementation of peace easier.
In general, first drafts of the case studies overwhelmingly gave the impression
that the refugee issue was not central to either the success or failure to implement the
peace agreement even in the two cases where the refugee issue was central to the war
itself. In some cases, most peace agreements were silent on the issue of the repatriation of
refugees. (Liberia) In other case studies, the study itself is silent on whether the
agreement even made any provision for refugees. (Sri Lanka) Even in cases where the
agreements and studies both mention repatriation of refugees (e.g. UN Resolution 814 re
Somalia), the case study provides no analysis of its import, consequences, etc. Where
discussion is provided, it is generally terse and really mentioned as a factual aside rather
than perceived as a key to understanding the core of the peace agreement and its effects
on implementation strategies. Is refugee repatriation a marginal issue with respect to the
implementation of peace agreements, and, if so, why?
The Issue of Scholarly Bias
Based on the draft case studies, I was tempted to conclude that refugee
repatriation was indeed marginal to the success in implementing most peace agreements,
contrary to the virtually universal assumption of most scholars and practitioners in the
refugee field. This was also in spite of the fact that a provision for refugee repatriation
was more often than not a provision within a peace agreement.
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This conclusion carried with it intuitive plausibility even though it ran contrary to
conventional wisdom. After all, refugees, as long as they remained legitimate refugees,
were perceived as victims rather than perpetrators of the violence. The key issue in
maintaining the peace was stopping the perpetrators of violence, not assisting the victims,
as laudable and humanitarian as the latter task is. Refugees would certainly be the
beneficiaries of the cessation of violence just as they were its victims, but qua refugees
they had no role to play in whether the violence stopped.
Further, the conflicts in which I had specialized – the Israel/Palestinian fifty year
war, the Rwandan conflict and the succession wars following the break-up of Yugoslavia
– were all ones in which the issue of refugee repatriation or non-repatriation were
essential parts of the conflict.  So I was preconditioned to generalize from that experience
to believe that refugee repatriation was always a central issue in any civil war.  Perhaps
the issue of refugee repatriation was only central to a peace agreement in those cases
where the issue of refugees played a central role in the continuation of a conflict. In other
civil wars where refugees were by-products of the violence, but not central to the original
or continuing conflict, the success or failure of that repatriation would not be central to
the success in implementing a peace agreement. This might be the case even though a
peace agreement might, understandably, provide for the repatriation of those refugees.
However, when I reviewed the citations of the very scholarly case studies of the
civil wars, there were few if any references to the academic literature with which I was
familiar dealing with refugee repatriation in those areas. Further, when I reviewed that
literature myself on refugee repatriation in relationship to the case studies, contrary to the
impressions of those case studies, in many cases, rr&r appeared to be central where the
objective was the achievement of positive peace. Successful refugee repatriation and
reintegration were essential in order to eliminate conditions that could lead to the
resumption of violent conflict even if not essential to the cessation of violence.
Perhaps assigning a marginal role to the refugee repatriation issue was a product
of the bias of scholars who were focussed on war and negative peace rather than
humanitarian issues or long term positive peace. Perhaps a wide cultural gap existed
between scholars dealing with humanitarian issues and ones concerned with conflict
studies. If a connection between refugee repatriation and the implementation of a peace
agreement exists, close attention would have to be paid to both the case studies of refugee
repatriation as well as the actual process of implementing a peace agreement.
The Centrality of Refugee Issues to Conflict and Peace – Numbers
Refugee issues would appear to be central to the issue of conflict and peace based
simply on numbers repatriated. According to Koser (1999, 3), at least 12 million refugees
were repatriated in the 1990s. In 1992 alone, in 20 operations, 1.7 million self-repatriated
refugees were assisted and 720,000 were directly repatriated under UNHCR auspices,
mostly in South Africa, Cambodia, the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan. (Berthiaume and
Mundo 1992) The June 90/April 91 settlement plan for the Western Sahara provided for
“the return, within six weeks, of about 120,000 Saharan refugees (at least half the
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population) from Algeria and Mauritius starting eleven weeks after D-Day under
UNHCR supervision. The 1992-1994 peace-building operation in Mozambique involved
the repatriation of 1.6 million refugees. However, Preston (1999, 19) suggests that the
percentage of returnees to refugees has actually declined in the late nineties. Further, the
proportion of those involuntarily returned increased between 1992 and 1996.
Certainly, large numbers of refugees and displaced persons are generally at least a
by-product if not an actual intended product of violent conflict.27  In Bosnia and Kosovo,
for example, Elizabeth Cousens noted that by the time the Dayton Agreement was
initialed, “over half of Bosnia’s pre-war population of 4.4 million had fled their original
homes, either to live as refugees outside the country or as internally displaced persons
elsewhere in Bosnia.” (8) The Sierra Leone 1990s war produced 400,000 refugees
(8.97% of the population) and one-third of the 4.6 million population was internally
displaced. In turn, Sierra Leone hosted 69,000 Liberian refugees while Guinea held
225,000. By the second phase of refugee production, 1992-1995, (the first wave between
1990-1991 produced 350,000 refugees) 500,000 had fled Liberia to Cote d”Ivoire as well
as Guinea and Sierra Leone; by 1995, half the population of Liberia had been displaced.
(van Damme 1999, 37-41)
The Angolan conflict is another situation in which the numbers of refugees and
internally displaced escalated from the original 425,000 refugees and 800,000 internally
displaced recorded in 1991 to the over one million in each category in 1999. 500,000
refugees were produced by the Cambodian conflict. In El Salvador, there were one
million refugees and an additional 750,000 displaced produced by the violent conflict in
that country.  The Nicaraguan civil war resulted in 500,000 refugees and another 360,000
internally displaced; the half million refugees represented 12% of the population. In
Guatemala, the one million internally displaced overwhelmed the 150,000 who managed
to escape the country to seek asylum elsewhere. In Namibia, there may only have been
44,000 to 90,000 refugees, but in Western Sahara, at least half the population became
refugees. In Sri Lanka, there were 200,000 refugees and 400,000 in Sierra Leone.
Rwanda had 350,000 and almost a million internally displaced before the signing of the
Arusha Accords. A new batch of at least a million and one half refugees fled the country
after the military coup, the assassination of the President and the genocide of up to
800,000 Rwandans. After the fall of Mogadishu in 1991, in the northern part of the
                                                
27 The issue of numbers is almost as complex as the problem of definition. In refugee-like situations, the
numbers flowing in and out are in constant flux where monitoring is often difficult and sometimes
impossible. The numbers change in relationship to the degree of violence and the perceived sense of
security. There is also the problem of inaccuracy in the sources for the figures. In the case of the Palestinian
refugees, there were over 900,000 registered Palestinian refugees originally, and 2.8 million currently,
though scholarly figures establish the original range between 660,000 and 720,000. (Adelman 1997b) In the
case of the Rwandese refugees in Zaire in 1996, there were supposed to be roughly 1,200,000 according to
UNHCR. An estimated 650,000 to 750,000 returned. What happened to the other over 400,000 refugees?
Were the refugee warriors included in the counts? Were the original figures overestimated either way?
Evidently, a number were slaughtered (Human Rights Watch - Zaire 1997), and even the most pessimistic
view suggests a figure of as high as 100,000. What happened to the other 300,000 “phantom refugees”?
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Ogaden, there were 594,000 Somali refugees and 217,000 displaced out of a total
population in the region of I million.
How could there be peace unless such large numbers of individuals are repatriated
and successfully reintegrated into their homes once again? Further, in some cases,
without peace, more refugees were produced even as repatriation was underway in other
parts of the same country.
Volatility of the Plight of Refugees - A Sample Week of Numbers
Even where peace agreements had been signed, the situation with respect to
refugees remains volatile. Sampling the week at the end of July and the beginning of
August 1999 provides some glimpse into the difficulty in correlating peace agreements
and refugee repatriation.
While the latest agreement in the Sierra Leone civil war (Togo, 7 July 1999) held,
refugees were not repatriating. At the same time, in Guatemala, many years after the
Civil War had ostensibly ended, the final group of Guatemalan refugees returned home
under an organized UNHCR return operation after the refugees had lived for 16 years in
refugee camps in Mexico’s Yucatan Peninsula and Chiapas. At the same time, the
UNHCR, Thailand and Laos had just agreed to the final return of 1,300 Lao refugees still
in Thailand. Thus, rr&r often does not occur following the cessation of hostilities, but
may occur many years later.
Further, refugees may be repatriated before the cessation of hostilities. Thus, in
the beginning of August 1999, the Thai government determined that 250,000 Burmese
refugees would be repatriated over the next three years. UNHCR was faced with what
may have appeared to the organization as the lesser of two evils – cooperating in the
forced repatriation of a refugee population lest the refugees be bereft of any humanitarian
assistance or legal protection whatsoever.
If some refugees repatriate many years after a war is over and others return or are
forced to return even before a war ends, some wars never seem to end and refugees are a
continuing by-product.  At the end of July 1999, Malniye in Angola was packed with
130,000 people displaced by the renewed conflict; they were living in appalling
conditions. The UN’s IRIN information unit in the Department of Humanitarian Affairs
reported that as of 27 July 1999, there were over 1.7 million displaced in Angola, of
whom 930,000 were newly displaced as a result of the renewed violent conflict. 4,000 of
those displaced were in Namibia, mainly in Osire.
Meanwhile, Namibia was itself suffering from renewed violence as a result of an
allegedly Angolan rebel sponsored secessionist movement led by Mishake Muyongo,
head of the Caprivi Liberation Army in Northern Namibia’s Caprivi Strip. During the
previous year, 2,000 refugees had fled the area to Botswana. UNHCR had just assisted
1,300 to return when the violence flared up once again.
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At the same time, the DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo) civil war continued
with fresh clashes between Balendu and Wagerepue, with thousands of homes torched
and thousands of new refugees produced just as peace agreements were in the process of
being signed by all factions in the fighting. In the interim, 95% of the displaced people
from South Kivu were returning home even before the agreements were concluded. But
in the very same region where these returnees were coming home, and at the very same
time, violent incidents instigated by the Interahamwe militia, a major perpetrator of the
1994 genocide in Rwanda, were producing more refugees. In another region of the DRC,
again in the same period, fighting along the Angola-DRC border produced a new large
outflow of refugees from the DRC.
During this same short time frame, Sadako Ogata, the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees, claimed that, “the most pressing refugee problem for the Great Lakes region
was the need to tackle the problem of the Rwandese who had not yet returned after
fleeing their country in the aftermath of genocide (1994).” Ogata went on to say that
UNHCR would resume support for the repatriation of Rwandese still in eastern DRC.
Rwandans in the Republic of Congo would be offered either repatriation or the
opportunity to settle in the north of their host country. (UN, DHA IRIN information unit,
30 July 1999) Meanwhile, in another region of the DRC, 30,000 refugees had recently
fled into Gabon.
In the same state, the DRC, as peace agreements (as I stated above) were being
forged, settlement of refugees from another country was being planned. Meanwhile, 6000
to 7000 refugees in the Bangui area, and a further 13,00028 in the Mobaye area, were in
perilous condition. Further, many thousands of new refugees were being produced.
Elsewhere, a refugee camp in Tanzania, planned for 40,000 DRC refugees, was being
overwhelmed with twice that number.
Jumping to another continent, the refugees repatriated as a result of the victory of
NATO forces in Kosovo were being partially offset by the 160,000 Serbs and Roma who
had fled the same area as the Albanian Kosovars returned. I have presented this partial
cross section of a week in the international arena to indicate how refugees can return and
be produced at the same time as peace agreements are being forged and implemented, or
are being sabotaged and undermined. Refugees may be repatriated many years after
peace agreements are signed or years before there is any sign of a conflict ending. How
does one make sense out of this chaos and confusion?
Four Major Themes in Refugee Repatriation
There are at least four major themes that emerge from these observations and
which are discussed widely in relationship to refugee repatriation. First, do refugees
enjoy a right of return?29 Second, is the return voluntary or not?30 Third, was the return
                                                
28 This population included 6,000 DRC soldiers, so that almost half were, strictly speaking, not refugees.
29 For discussions of the right of return, see Adelman (1996a, 1996d and 1994a); Brown (1994); Ferris
(1993); Frelick (1990);  Hannum (1987); Hathaway and Dent (1995); Kampelman (1993).
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organized by the international community or was it ‘spontaneous”; more precisely, did
the refugees instigate and organize their own repatriation (self-repatriation) or were they
repatriated under the auspices of some international organization? (Kuhlman 1994; Stein
and Cuny 1984; Skari 1985)31 Though none of these issues appears to have a direct
concern on how repatriation and peace agreements to end civil wars affected one another,
the discussion of the latter issue will have some bearing on these three major themes.
Further, as we shall see, some misconceptions about these three themes certainly affect
the formulation and implementation of some peace agreements.
A fourth theme, whether refugees return during or after a conflict, does have a
direct and obvious bearing on the relationship of repatriation and peace agreements.32
This project is focused on refugee repatriation and reintegration during the
implementation of a peace accord. So we must differentiate between those cases where
the repatriation takes place prior to the signing of the accord and those that follow such a
signing. If refugee repatriation takes place after a peace accord (sometimes many years
after) is this repatriation a result of the peace accord? Many refugees wait in camps until
they feel that the peace is really secure; the peace accord in itself provides no such
assurance.33
The first theme, the right of refugee return, was specified in some peace
agreements. Part V of the Cambodian peace agreement recognized the right of return of
the refugees to Cambodia where they could live in safety, security and dignity, free from
intimidation and coercion of any kind. The Lebanon Ta’if Agreement sets out the right of
each person displaced to return to ‘the place from whence he was displaced’ but, as Harik
(1997) noted, the provision occupied a second-tier status in the agreement.
                                                                                                                                                
30 Voluntary repatriation is the most discussed theme in the refugee repatriation literature. For articles and
books specifically on this theme, see Asia Watch (1992); Bakewell (1999); Barber (1986); Boshyk (1980);
Chimni (1991); Crisp (1984a, 1987); Dawson (1991); Epstein (1973); Goodwin-Gill (1989); Hammond
(1999); Jambon (1990); Khiddu-Makubuya (1994); Law (1995); McCallum (1990); Rabe (1990); Reynall
and Jackman (1990); Stainsby (    ); Standly (1990) Tandai (1995); UNHCR (1985, 1987, 1993b); Warner
(1994); Zieck (1997). Hathaway (1997) argues that ‘voluntariness’ is not an integral element within the
refugee convention itself. Chimni (1999) argues that only in the second phase of search for the durable
solutions after WWII – 1985-1993 – did voluntary repatriation replace resettlement as the preferred option.
Subsequently, UNHCR was forced to accept the reality of the rising tide of involuntary returnees either in
the form of ‘safe return’ or ‘imposed return’, a development to which Chimni objects and which he
attributes to the failure of burden sharing by the developed world. The analysis by Fabienne (1988)
provides the best dissection that I have studied of the premises of voluntary repatriation.
31 See the discussion of the literature on specific IGOs in relationship to refugee repatriation: Adelman on
UNRWA 1987, 1992c, 1994f;  Boegle and Rappaz (1990) in relationship to the ICRC, Crisp (1990) in
relationship to the UNHCR, and Hogg (1996) and Lipsey (1997) in more general terms. Thus, the Boegle
and Rappaz (1990) report for the ICRC stressed the combination of organization and voluntariness in their
emphasis on good information, careful planning and inter-agency cooperation as the most important
ingredients in facilitating voluntary repatriation. See also Qishi (1990) who makes the same point. So does
the UNHCR (1993a) in its model for repatriation.
32 Cuny and Stein have written the most on this issue (Cuny et al 1992; Stein and Cuny 1991 and 1992;
Stein, Cuny and Reed 1995), but there is a very good discussion in Narvesen (1992).
33 Taking Mozambique as an example again, though 20% of the refugees repatriated three years before the
peace agreement was signed, a full year after the agreement had been signed, only 30% in total had
returned. It took until 1994 for the repatriation to be completed. (Bonga and Wilson 1993)
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Yet the right of return has only an indirect connection to the successful
implementation of a peace agreement. As shall be seen, insisting on a right of return to
homes and not just to homelands can complicate and make more problematic both the
making of peace and the ability to enforce the right. This is particularly the case if the
right of return, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is part of the agreement. And it is generally
only specified when it is problematic. This occurs in situations where the removal of part
of the population was either a specific war aim or a welcomed even if unintended
consequence of a conflict between two ethnic groups.
The issue of voluntary return also has an indirect bearing in the relationship of
refugee repatriation to the implementation of peace agreements. For most peace
agreements when they focus on refugee repatriation usually affix the modifier
“voluntary” to that repatriation exercise even when the repatriation is promoted, induced
and even, in some cases, forced. For example, in the movement of Mozambicans back
from South Africa after the peace agreement was signed, UNHCR resorted to phasing out
food rations distributed in South Africa to encourage return. In other cases, food for work
programs and efforts to make camps less hospitable are techniques used to induce refugee
repatriation. (Ruiz 1987) There is certainly a great deal of evidence to suggest that the
Cambodian repatriation was induced and not strictly voluntary. (Bernander et al 1995;
Chantavanich and Benyasut 1989). Thus, the norm established in the agreement and the
actual practice may be at odds. More importantly, the enunciation of the norm may
complicate the return process as was evident in the case of the return of Rwandan
refugees.
Sometimes, however, induced return is itself a source of exacerbating a conflict.
One of the most common discussions with respect to repatriation of Sri Lankan refugees
is whether it had been voluntary, especially between 1987 and 1989. (Cuny and Cuny 60,
85; Robinson; Zieck, 10, fn. 29) Since it is unlikely that many refugees wanted to return
(except those who volunteered to fight), it has been suggested that pressure to return
made the possibility of peace less likely. The effect of a perceived view by Tamils of no
options on where to go made them more desperate and more determined and less inclined
to compromise on the principle of self-governance.
In some cases, individuals have no choice whatsoever. They may be forced to
return to their home countries or other countries following a peace (Palestinians from
Kuwait who went to Jordan following the Gulf War) with no provision or international
assistance. (Richmond 1994, 215) In the language of Richmond, such repatriation will be
reactive rather than proactive. In such cases refugees are produced as a result of the
“peace” even when those individuals may not de facto have been refugees any longer
since they had resettled in that host country and had been living there in relative security
for years.
In other cases, there are states like Pakistan with the apparent power to induce
repatriation of Afghan refugees, but not the de facto power. (Irfani and Rahman 1991)
Though Pakistan wanted to induce repatriation, the 1989 UN Plan of Action to foster
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rr&r was ineffective. (Knowles 1992) For the longest period, insecurity in the homeland
of the refugees inhibited return. By 1990, 473 repatriation projects and sub-projects were
launched. (English 1989; UNOCA 1990) In 1992, 1.4 million Afghan refugees suddenly
did return, but the continuing inter-ethnic fighting among the rebel groups that overthrew
the Najibullah government inhibited the return of several million more remaining in
Pakistan. (Ruiz 1992)
Third, most peace agreements that refer to refugee repatriation assume that the
repatriation will be organized by the international community. Thus, in the case of
refugees from the Western Sahara, UNHCR opened a field office in Tindouf in July 1996
with a budget of $50 million to provide documentation and reception centers for
returning refugees and to monitor events following repatriation for 31,000 refugees in
Tindouf and 22,000 in Mauritius. Not one refugee returned given the political difficulties
with the identification process.
In fact, most returns are spontaneous.34 (Akol 1987; Winter 1994, 168) They
precede (Narvesen and Solberg 1992; Cuny et al 1992)35 or immediately follow the
signing of an accord (the internally displaced in Rwanda, August 1993). In Mozambique,
repatriation preceded the conclusion of a peace agreement. (Lailun 1991; Koser 1997;
Wilson and Nunes 1994). As Koser puts it, “Even before the Peace Accord, quite large
scale self-repatriations were estimated to have occurred from Malawi. The Government
of Mozambique estimated that by the end of 1989 up to 200,000 refugees had
repatriated.” (5) By 1992, 30% of the refugees from Mangochi and Nkhata had
repatriated to Niassa, though there were earlier return movements that did not last, such
as when Renamo seized Milange in 1986-7.
The role of the UNHCR in Mozambique, according to most scholars, was a
failure with respect to the official repatriation program. (Wilson and Nunes 1994, 167;
Koser 1997; Dolan 1999) As Dolan notes, “the majority of refugees who returned from
other countries to Mozambique did so without UNHCR assistance. (95) Further, as he
says, “the repatriation from South Africa was “remarkably unsuccessful,” (99) and,
according to Dixon/Fyle (1994), was the largest program in Africa to that date. Overall,
of 1.7 million refugees, only 378,000 or 22% were repatriated under UNHCR auspices.
(Dixon-Fyle provide a figure of 13% from South Africa.)
There are many different reasons for spontaneous returns. They occur in response
to violence in the diaspora, or never take place whatsoever, whether provided for in the
agreements or not (former Palestine and Yugoslavia), or take place as a concomitant of
the pursuit of the conflict through other means than war (Cambodia and Zaire). Thus, a
                                                
34 For example, of the 46,000 Guatemalans in refugee camps in Mexico, a very small number, 1-2000 a
year, were repatriated under a UNHCR scheme beginning in 1987, although a high birth rate in the camps
kept the overall numbers constant. According to Stepputat (1999), about half the repatriated Guatemalans
from Mexico were repatriated in an organized fashion and half repatriated individually (18,800 versus
17,400) (272).
35 For example, in Mozambique, by the end of 1989, 200,000 of the over 1 million refugees had self-
repatriated even though the peace agreement was not signed until 1992. (Bonga and Wilson 1993)
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repatriation or reintegration plan may not be in place, or, if it is in place and provides for
an orderly and safe return (cf. Otsea 1991), the plan may not be utilised in the face of a
sudden, massive return. In fact, refugees may leave behind systems of international
protection and assistance to return without assistance or guarantees of protection, more or
less as per their original flight. Or refugees may organise their own return on a systematic
basis, as in El Salvador. There, the refugees who were repatriated were self-repatriated
(Edwards and Siebentritt 1991, 97; Zieck 1997, 121; Weiss et al 1991, 177) but used the
organized international community as logistic aids for travel and food en route. That the
process was entirely self-governed was an unusual feature of the El Salvador repatriation
and had the significance, possibly, of putting in place one of the basis for self-governance
and democracy.
Then again, the international community may be used to provide witnesses and
enhance security in the repatriation process. In the Guatemalan refugee repatriation, the
NGOs played a major role as observers of safe return through the international
accompaniment program and emergency response network to stop acts of violence,
intimidation and injustice. (cf. Coy 1993; Baines 1998; Costello 1995; NCOORD 1996;
CONGCOOP 1997; Mahoney and Eguren 1997; Koehl 1997; Levitt 1999) In the case of
Namibia, UNTAG was given the responsibility of overseeing the refugee return.
It must not be forgotten that the main decision-makers in refugee repatriation are
not always or even mainly the international brokers or the parties to the conflict. The
refugees themselves are frequently the key decision-makers determining whether and
when they will return. Peace agreements rarely make provision for this fact or for the
suddenness of refugee movements and the calculus refugees make on relative risks. In the
case of one of the most successful peace agreements, Mozambique, 1.5 million refugees
and 4 million internally displaced were determined to repatriate in spite of the widespread
devastation. Goods and services were in short supply. Many refugees repatriated on their
own, though international assistance contributed by easing the distress somewhat. (Cf.
Dumptra 1993) UNHCR joined the negotiations only after the relevant Protocol V was
signed as well as Protocol VII concerning the convening of a refugee conference, but, in
that agreement, the process or modalities of refugee repatriation were not dealt with as
part of the peace process. In the March 16, 1993 Memorandum of Understanding
between Mozambique and UNHCR, Part VII calls only for the UNHCR to “promote”
rather than deliver return.
Different Senses of Peace and Different Types of Civil Wars
If the above four themes are the ones usually discussed in relationship to refugee
repatriation, one that does not seem to have been discussed is the relationship of
repatriation to the type of war which produced the refugees and the type of peace
intended by the agreement. The following distinctions are made to disaggregate the issue.
Types of Peace 1. Negative Peace – cessation of violent military conflict
2. Positive Peace  -- reconciliation of conflicting parties
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Types of War 1. Ethnic Wars - People Wars over Sovereignty
a) Anti-People Wars – wars of exclusion;
b) Pro-People Wars - wars between ethnic and/or
religious groups for control or secession;
2. Power Wars - wars fought for political control only:
a) Governing Wars motivated by ideology, driven by
regional hegemons, and/or determining succession after an
anti-imperial war;
b) Warlord Wars.
Signed peace agreements rarely produce a total cessation of violence when the
agreements are signed. Time elapses. More negotiations take place clarifying the terms of
the agreement.  More importantly, in reading the case studies of the implementation of
peace agreements, it also becomes readily evident that most commentators are concerned
with negative peace, that is, the cessation of violent organized hostilities between or
among the parties involved in the conflict. The authors are rarely if ever concerned with
positive peace, the creation of conditions that turn the hostility between and among the
conflicting parties into a cooperative working arrangement. (Cf. North and Simmons,
1999 for an exception.) Repatriation may be defined as successful even if only a negative
peace is achieved. However, successful reintegration depends on the achievement of
positive peace and may be essential in turn to that achievement.
More significantly, the issue of repatriation in connection with the
implementation of a peace agreement is closely tied to the type of civil war that had been
underway. The most basic difference is between wars fought between peoples vying for
sovereignty in a state versus civil wars simply fought over the control of the government
of a sovereign state.
One sub-type of a war for sovereign control between peoples is based on
inclusion and exclusion - Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda.36 In the case of Rwanda, the
issue of refugee repatriation was central. A brief overview of Rwandan recent history will
indicate why.
In the Mwanza regional meeting in Tanzania on 17 October 1990 following the
invasion of Rwanda by the RPF, the resolution of the refugee issue was put forth as a
central issue. That problem had been left unresolved since the Tuitsi fled between 1959 to
1966.37 Before 1991, Habyarimana had claimed that because of the population density of
                                                
36 Kosovo was not one of the case studies, but it too is an example in which a major objective of the war
was ethnic cleansing of a population group. The instigators of the ethnic cleansing were the Serbs. The
ethnic cleansing was reversed and the refugees were repatriated with the NATO victory over the Serb
forces. Unfortunately, NATO was not the de facto force on the ground in many areas, and 160,000 Serbs
and Roma fled in fear or were forced or intimidated into fleeing because of actual violent killings, allegedly
by the Kosovars.
37 Though the causes for the initiation of the 1 October 1990 Rwanda war were more complex, Kobak
(1997) stressed the importance of refugee repatriation. “The Habyarimana regime’s reluctance to permit the
return of exiled Rwandan Tutsi combined with the Ugandan government’s refusal to grant the Tutsi
refugees citizenship precipitated the 1990 RPF military invasion of northern Rwanda.” (156)
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Rwanda and the shortage of land, the refugee issue needed to be resolved in an
international context. Only in early 1991 did Habyarimana begin to shift in his rhetorical
response to the refugee issue. Though he had agreed in the Dar es Salaam conference of
February 1991 to remove obstacles to voluntary repatriation and to give an amnesty to
refugees who had allegedly committed crimes against the state, he continued to see the
resolution of the refugee issue in a regional context. This was unlikely to be realized
since Habyarimana made this easing of restrictions conditional upon Uganda, Burundi,
Tanzanaia and Zaire all agreeing to naturalize and integrate those refugees who chose not
to return.
The refugee issue continued to be a central theme in the peace negotiations.
Between March and June of 1992, the repatriation of the refugees was one of the major
items, but it remained linked within a larger context of settlement in countries of first
asylum. By October 1992, the protocols on power sharing in the 30 October agreement
set repatriation of refugees as one of the central goals for the transitional government.
Finally, the Arusha Accords included a protocol on the repatriation of refugees which
was signed on 9 June 1993. That protocol referred to the inalienable rights of refugees to
return home to the region of their choice.
However, the peace agreement was not implemented. The war resumed, and the
RPF won. The government fled into exile with about a million and a half new refugees.
The victors in the civil war believed in an integrated vision of membership in the state.
That is, the membership of the state was defined as Rwandan rather than Hutu or Tutsi.
The enemies of that idea held to a belief that the essential membership of the state was
reserved for Hutu; Tutsi, if they were even to be tolerated, were to be restricted to second
class status in the state. The war fought until the Arusha Peace Accords were signed in
August of 1993 had as a central component these two visions. When the accords were
signed between the invading forces, led by refugees wanting to return, and moderates
who accepted the integrated vision, extremists who did not agree, and who held to a
vision of the state that was essentially Hutu, set out to undermine the peace. When the
accords were on the verge of putting in place a new government based on that agreement
and integrated vision, the extremists staged a coup and initiated the genocide of the Tutsi.
When the extremist forces were defeated, they not only went into exile, but they led a
large group of the Hutu population into exile with them. The repatriation of those
refugees became part of the fundamental conflict. Would they remain in exile as part of
the extremist camp unequivocally opposed to the integrated vision of the Rwandan state,
or would they return to live with an integrated definition of the sovereign people of
Rwanda? By 1996, the issue was largely resolved when the refugee warriors intractably
opposed to an integrated idea of the state were militarily defeated and separated from the
bulk of the remaining refugees who returned to Rwanda.
Precisely the same issue was at stake in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, the
results were the opposite. The characterization of this type of people sovereignty war,
such as in Rwanda and Bosnia, is summed up by statement of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees.
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“(T)he conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the difficulty in ensuring refugee return in
its aftermath demonstrate that the international community has yet to come to grips with
contemporary wars fuelled by territorial and ethnic rivalries. In such conflicts the
expulsion of the ‘other’ ethnic group is a goal in itself and the perpetuation of the results
of ‘ethnic cleansing’.” (Ogata 1998, 197)
The results in Bosnia contrasted with those in Rwanda because the victors in the
war and the implementers of the peace agreement in Bosnia were all ethnic nationalists.
Yet the peace accords called for an integrated state, even if that state was constituted of
very powerful parts, each dominated by a different ethnic group. Further, to advance the
integrated vision, provision was made in the Dayton Peace Accords for the repatriation of
all refugees (and displaced persons) to their homes and not just their homelands.38 The
following steps were to be taken to ensure this repatriation and integration: refraining
from harassment, intimidation, persecution and discrimination. These provisions not only
applied to state authorities; others were to be prevented from doing the same. Further,
legislation was to be repealed and administrative practices stopped which discriminated
against minorities either in intent or effect; hate speech was to be prevented or
suppressed; those who violated rights of minorities were to be prosecuted. None of the
above took place to any significant measure. None of the parties in power on the ground
in Bosnia were signatories to the refugee convention that obliged states to protect
refugees. Further, only one regional states was a signatory – Croatia. (Watkin 1998, 119)
Instead of the authorities fostering repatriation, the reverse was true. Intimidation
against return was pervasive by state and quasi-state authorities. Empty houses were
burned most dramatically in Sarajevo upon the exodus of 60,000 Serbs following the
signing of the Dayton Accords. Those who controlled the different parts of the so-called
integrated polity, undermined and prevented the realization of that goal. Thus, there was
virtually no repatriation to areas in which the returnees would constitute the minority.
As Elizabeth Cousens stated in her case study, “full implementation of Annex 7
would amount to a flat-out reversal of the demographic course of the war…the
Agreement gave no guidance on how to manage its chief contradiction: namely, that it
both stabilized the lines of confrontation between Serb and Federation areas and within
the Federation, and derived political rights from this division; at the same time as it
obligated Parties to respect a right of return that could amount to reversing those lines
entirely.” (21-23)
The irony occurred when the international community brokering the peace and the
cessation of hostilities helped construct an agreement that prevented the repatriation of
refugees to their homes from taking place. The parties to the agreement, who were given
power through the agreement, had a vested interest in ensuring the non-return of refugees
to their homes. The international community, understandably wedded to an ideology and
vision of a multi-ethnic society, pursued the dream of minority returns in spite of all the
                                                
38 This is not quite true, although it is true of the primary interpretation given to the agreement by a high
proportion of the international NGO community concerned with Bosnia. Annex 7 of the Dayton Accords
obliges the parties to guarantee the voluntary return of the displaced OR compensation for property that
cannot be restored to them.
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evidence that the international community was not willing to do what was necessary to
make minority returns possible.39 Those who wanted IFOR to enforce the rights of
returnees in minority areas of Bosnia failed to recognize the military unwillingness to do
so, the political unwillingness to do so and the unprecedented nature of holding
international peacekeepers responsible for providing security to repatriated refugees.
(Watkin 1998, 125) IFOR was successful in suppressing any resumption of violent
conflict except when that violent conflict was a response to efforts to return refugees to
minority areas. Even the moderates, such as President Plavsic in Republika Srbska,
opposed minority returns. Because of the huge amount of resources invested in a fruitless
(and expensive) pursuit of fostering returns to minority areas, most refugees (and
internally displaced) were left in limbo.
The same effects can be followed by state government policies in Pro-People
Sovereignty Wars. In Lebanon, the villages which were first chosen for resettlement by
the government in Beirut were those that were uni-confessional based on the belief that
these would be the easiest to resettle, while mixed areas would by dealt with later. (Zahar,
39) However, Lebanon produced the same result as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but on a
municipal rather than a provincial level. Lebanon became a series of ethnically
homogeneous enclaves within a single state. The reasons are clear if we simplify the
depiction of the war. The Lebanese Civil War was one fought between ethnic/religious
groups for control of the state. The Muslims won. The Christians lost. The demographic
balance in Lebanon shifted irreversibly as many Christians immigrated. Those who
repatriated returned to religious enclaves.
In Sri Lanka, the story is somewhat different again, but it remains a war of control
between ethnic groups. The government insists on maintaining, as an inclusive part of the
state, the territory in the north where the Tamils predominate. The separatist movement,
led by the Tamil Tigers in the nineties, consists of ideological extremists. Their battle for
an exclusivist Tamil territory and state in the north of Sri Lanka is fought even more
viciously than the war waged by the Sri Lankan state. The result is a war to maintain
territorial inclusion versus very militant secessionists.
Thus, civil wars over the control of the governing structure where two or more
ethnic groups are fighting for either control of the state (Lebanon) or secession from the
state (Sri Lanka), are wars of inclusion and exclusion. The parties, however, have not
taken that extra step of defining the body politic to exclude totally its opponents by
means of mass expulsions or, in the extreme, genocide.
Repatriation of refugees is a central issue when the conflict is over the definition
of who constitutes the sovereign people and/or the territory that people may govern. Civil
                                                
39 In the late eighties and early 1990s, western countries were accused of pursuing a repatriation agenda
because of domestic concerns and the growing restrictive attitude with respect to refugees arriving on their
soil. (Harrell-Bond 1989; Christensen 1993) In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, they were
pursuing a specific form of repatriation for ethical ideological reasons rather than self-interested domestic
politics. But the results may have been even worse – refugees who could neither be repatriated, or, if
repatriated, were left with little means to successfully reintegrate.
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wars over membership and people sovereignty issues are wars targeted against members
of the body politic. In wars of exclusion, a specific war aim is the elimination of some
people as part of the polity by creating separate uni-ethnic states or ethnic enclaves, or
undertaking ethnic cleansing and genocide. In anti-people and pro-people civil wars,
refugees are a direct consequence of the violent conflict rather than merely a by-product.
A central war aim is to produce the refugees.
The war over the Western Sahara may have appeared to be a war of inclusion or
exclusion, with Morocco on the side of the inclusivists and the rebels characterized as
exclusionists. After all, the central issue in the peace negotiations was over inclusion.
Who was to be defined as members of the body politic? But the war only appeared to be
about inclusion and exclusion. The war over the Western Sahara was primarily one
between the indigenous population and those who were proxies of a regional hegemon,
many with dubious claims to Western Saharan residence. The issue of the constituent
membership of the body politic – who had a right to membership in the Western Sahara -
became an important aspect of implementing the peace agreement because that
agreement made provision for a referendum. Only the residents of the region were
eligible to vote to determine whether the people of the region wanted self rule or wanted
to be an integral part of an adjoining state, Morocco in this case. The implementation of
the peace agreement has been very protracted because of the questionable status of many
of the names that Morocco put forth as constituent members of the Western Saharan
region. The fights over status and membership only arose because the Moroccan
government seized control of the Western Saharan territory.
The Western Saharan war was not an anti-people war, even though a central issue
became membership in the body politic. It was really a war over the government to
succeed the departed or indirect hand of an imperial power. The Western Saharan conflict
was a proxy war. It was not the only one. Such proxy wars were also fought in Angola,
Cambodia and Mozambique as well as in the Central American countries of El Salvador,
Guatemala and Nicaragua. These civil wars were also ideological ones in which the
regional imperial power supported the conservative forces while the radical rebels fought
against the status quo, not only over the governance of the country but over the
distribution of wealth and power within the country. Refugee repatriation was one of the
dimensions to that power struggle.
From a certain angle of perception, ethnic and regional power were also issues,
though not primary ones, in the Angolan, Cambodian, El Salvadorean, Guatemalan,
Mozambican and Nicaraguan civil wars. Class conflict and ethnicity overlapped as issues
in the repatriation of Nicaraguan refugees from Honduras and Costa Rica. Thus, for
example, while the indigenous population of refugees returned en masse, few ladinos did.
(Basok 1990)
In a different kind of war over control of the government – Liberia, Sierra Leone
and Somalia – the war was over the control of the state by warlords who usually had an
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ethnic and regional base for their quest for power.40 But the war was not essentially an
inter-ethnic war where that ethnic group sought sovereign control.
A cursory examination readily indicates that the issue of refugee repatriation is
presumed to be only an issue of management of the process when the war is over. But in
anti-people and pro-people wars, the repatriation of refugees is a central issue in the
peace itself. For it is the definition of the sovereign people constituting the body politic
that is at stake. In other kinds of civil wars, mostly fought over who is to govern the state,
the issue of repatriating refugees does not go to the heart of the make-up of the body
politic. In some cases, though, it may go to the heart of the issue of electing the
government of that body politic. There is, thus, a large qualitative difference on the issue
of repatriation between anti-people wars of exclusion or inclusion, pro-people wars over
control, and the variety of civil wars fought over governance. In the latter type, the
problem of refugee repatriation is not so central to implementing any peace agreement as
in anti-people wars.
That does not mean that the repatriation issue is irrelevant to the implementation
of a peace agreement in wars over control of the government, for repatriation is often
closely linked to the holding of elections, as in Cambodia and Guatemala. However, in
Liberia, the 1997 elections saw only 75,000 refugees return home to participate. 550,000,
one-fifth of the population, were left disenfranchised. The issue of repatriation was a
consideration in the elections and the voting as seen in Protocol III (that provided for the
return of refugees and displaced persons) of the Mozambique General Peace Agreement
of 4 October 1992 between the government and Renamo. In addition to the linkage with
elections, there is also a connection of the timing of return in relation to elections. In
Mozambique, and, in contrast to Cambodia, repatriation was not required before the
elections could be held. (cf. Cammack 1992, ch.7, 21) In Nicaragua, though the
Sandanista government encouraged repatriation during the war, significant repatriation
did not take place until after the national elections of 1990.
At the other end of the scale, however, refugee repatriation may not be part of the
agreement (Angola and El Salvador) or may take place in significant numbers prior to the
end of hostilities, as in Mozambique and Nicaragua. In Sierra Leone, the refugee issue
became part of the second Conackry Peace Accords because of the interest of the
mediators. Countries that were hosting refugees were eager to see them return.
                                                
40 In addition to the weakness of institutional state structures, Bangura (1999, 21-22) stresses the role of
ethnicity as well as regionalism in the conflict. (4;8) “Once the AFRC formed an alliance with the RUF,
and some important elites from the North and Western Area decided to support or work with the AFRC
regime, the geo-ethnic political divisions became magnified. Sierra Leone is one of the few countries in
Africa that can be described as a multi-ethnic bi-polar polity characterized by the dominance of two
roughly equal ethnic groups in a multi-ethnic setting. Elite politicization of ethnicity in this type of polity
often leads to smaller groups coalescing with either of the larger ones in the competition for power.” (1)
Nevertheless, the RUF and the AFRC are not ethnic organizations, though the regional base of the RUF is
Eastern and Southern, while that of the AFRC is Northern and Western, and each region is dominated by a
different ethnic group.
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Thus, the second main type of civil war is over control of the government of the
polity. The people are an incidental target of the war; their elimination is not a war aim in
itself. They are not anti-people wars as much as ordinary civilians, and very many of
them, may be victims of such wars. In warlord wars as distinct from other wars to gain
control over the government, the ruthlessness often result in large numbers of civilian
deaths. Further, the various sub-types of non-warlord wars are not mutually exclusive
categories. In some cases, the wars are over succession following an anti-imperial war
(Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique and, in part, Western Sahara). In other cases, they are
primarily ideological wars as in Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala and
Nicaragua. In still other cases, they are proxy wars for nearby hegemons as in Angola,
Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala and Lebanon. As often as not, these wars are
determined by more than one factor.
The different types of war and the cases closest to them can be summarized in the
following chart.
Type of War Cases  
1. Ethnic Wars
a) Anti-People Wars of exclusion Bosnia (ethnic cleansing)
Rwanda (genocide)
b) Pro-People Wars – segregationist Lebanon
secessionist Sri Lanka
2. Power Wars - wars fought for political control only
a) Governing Wars over:
i) imperial succession Angola
Cambodia
Mozambique
Western Sahara
ii) ideology  Angola
Cambodia
El Salvador
Guatemala
Nicaragua
iii) proxies for regional Angola
hegemons Cambodia
El Salvador
Guatemala
Lebanon
b) Anti-Government Wars by Liberia
competing warlords Sierra Leone
Somalia
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All types of war have a direct impact on the four themes of refugee repatriation –
the right to return, voluntary repatriation, organized or spontaneous return and whether
refugees return before a conflict is over. In civil wars against people fought over the
constituency of the body politic, if the victorious parties are exclusionists in defining the
body politic, the powers in control will not grant any right to return whatever the peace
agreement says. Perhaps they could be coerced to do so by more powerful forces willing
and able to commit military power to undertake such a task, as in Kosovo, but this is not
something observed in any of the case studies that were part of the project. There are
simply very few opportunities for any significant voluntary repatriation to the original
homes of the refugees no matter how hard the international community tries to facilitate
the return of refugees. In most cases, the best that can be achieved is repatriation to the
homeland in areas where the power in control belongs to the same ethnic group.
Refugees as Products of Peace Agreements
Refugees are produced by civil wars and are intentional products of civil wars
fought over the definition of the sovereign people. Refugees are also both intentional and
unintentional products of the end of violent conflict in a civil war when the kind of war is
one fought over which people are sovereign. Even in anti-People Sovereign Wars, when
the victors are those with an integrationist rather than ethnic definition of the sovereign
people, refugees are produced. When violence ends by victory of one side – either one
ethnic group or the other - or even those who hold a non-ethnic definition of the body
politic – many supporters of the defeated side flee. They may be Serbs and Roma from
Kosovo or Hutus from Rwanda. This phenomenon occurs even when violent conflict
ceases with the signing of a peace agreement rather than being based on victory of one
side. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, tens of thousands of Serbs fled or were induced to flee
Sarajevo after the Dayton Accords were signed. Thus, in these types of wars, refugees
may be the product of the peace agreement as well as its beneficiaries (different groups in
each case, of course).
Even though power wars are not in general directed at the people, repatriation of
refugees may be encouraged or discouraged by the different sides. Some returnees, for
example, could strengthen the FLMN in Angola while others would not. The fact that a
civil war is fought over control of the state and not over the issue of sovereignty of a
people does not mean that the issue of refugee repatriation is depoliticized.
Regional Context
Another aspect that needs to be considered in the relationship of refugee
repatriation to the implementation of peace agreements is the regional context. Peace is
intended between and among various groups. The goal of that peace is not just the
cessation of bloodletting and violence, but economic development, the protection of
human rights, the introduction or development of democratic practices, the protection of
minority rights, all as conditions of long term physical, legal, social and psychological
security. Peace is a regional and not just a national issue when dealing with an intra-state
war. Consequently, that regional context will have many dimensions.
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The first is the immediate regional security context. Instability in one state has
repercussions on the neighboring states. In the extreme case, the Congo, there are in fact
six wars going on at the same time, each in relation to a different neighbor or set of
adjacent states. Refugees have a dramatic impact on the stability and economic health of
a region. Thus, even when refugees are not an objective of the conflict itself, they may
engender conflict in neighboring states or use their camps in neighboring states as bases
from which to launch attacks on their former homeland. Thai stability, domestic politics
and security were crucial motives in Thai support for the Cambodia peace agreement and
the repatriation of the refugees. (Chantavanich and Benyasut 1989)
The risk of refugee camps being used by refugee warriors is determined, in part,
by the location of the refugee camps. That location is often predetermined by
environmental, social, political, logistical and financial constraints rather than the
security of the region and of the refugees themselves. Further, when the rule of law is
weak in the neighboring state where the refugees have obtained temporary asylum, and
the refugees are prevented from repatriation, the propensity to metamorphose into refugee
warriors became much greater.
Even if the refugees do not become refugee warriors, but certainly if they do,
there will be a strong likelihood that many refugees will become involved in illegal entry,
drug trafficking, crime, prostitution and the arms trade. Any involvement of this type will
add to the destabilizing propensities in the region. A solution to the refugee problem is
especially crucial before the refugees acquire a reputation by associating even marginally
with criminal activities.
When there is a determined interest of one party to prevent refugee repatriation -
because the conflict is over the definition of the body politic or possibly even where the
refugees will likely support one side in an electoral battle provided for in the agreement -
it is important to make provision for a permanent resolution to the refugee problem for
the security of the region. However, in exclusionary civil wars over the definition of the
sovereign body politic in which ethnic cleansing is a central element, and where
processes of ethnic homogenization in specific territories have been a result of the civil
war, refugee repatriation to homes is unlikely to be one of the permanent solutions. Quite
aside from the humanitarian concern for the refugees, long-term regional stability will
require another solution to the problem of refugees than repatriation to their homes.
Beyond the immediate spatial context, there are larger regional factors at work
that make the resolution of the refugee issue necessary when drawing up and
implementing a peace agreement. There are regional economic factors. But necessity and
easy feasibility are not necessarily in synch. If refugees are not repatriated, if ethnic
separation becomes the de facto solution when the ethnic cleansers are the de facto
winners, then the regional distrust between and among the ethnic enclaves will engender
heightened distrust and hamper if not sabotage efforts to get regional trade moving again.
Since regional inter-state trade usually constitutes the major part of economic exchanges
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between and among states, the failure to repatriate refugees may deform local trading
exchanges and seriously hamper the prospects of economic recovery from the conflict.
The International Role in Refugee Repatriation
In Central America, CIREFCA was committed to the repatriation of refugees
throughout the region. It was also an effort to strengthen the presence of the UN as well
as the working relationship between the UN and NGOs. Thus, in understanding the issue
of refugee repatriation in civil wars, the role of international actors must be taken into
account as well as the interests of local states and regional players.
In forging the peace agreement, the repatriation of refugees may be more of an
issue for the interveners than for the combatants. The interveners may push for a faster
peace agreement without key details of the peace being worked out because those
interveners have become anxious to see the refugees off their soil and back across the
border. In the war in Sierra Leone, the 1996 Abidjan Peace Agreement made no provision
for the repatriation of refugees. In contrast, when interveners played a much more
significant role in the peace negotiations, the 1997 Conakry Agreement included such a
provision. A central difference in the 1997 Agreement was the fact that ECOWAS, with
power to enforce the agreement, was a party to the agreement intent not only on covering
all the bases rather than avoiding explosive issues, but had its own interests at stake in
resolving the refugee issue.
Globalization of the market system has also been a force for putting local
conflicts within a larger context. This can be seen in some of the provisions of more
recent peace agreements. Hence, major powers have an interest in any civil war.  But the
right to membership in a state of one’s choice has not been globalized. Major western
powers have both a low tolerance for receiving masses of refugee flows41 at the same
time as they practice a low risk strategy in dealing with the conflicts that produce such
flows.  There is an unwillingness to risk the lives of one’s own soldiers even to save large
numbers of lives at risk in intra-state wars. Therefore, they seek strategies that try to limit
the irritability produced by the threat of a large influx of refugees. At the same time,
major powers adopt strategies which minimize the risk to their own military. However,
the historical context in which solutions to refugee problems are put forth may rule out
the promotion of other solutions to the refugee problem than refugee repatriation.
There is another aspect of the globalization issue that receives little attention.
Refugees resettled in the diaspora, particularly in developed countries, serve both to
exacerbate a conflict by funding different parties to the conflict and acting as their
propaganda agents, but also assist in reintegrating refugees through the transfer of
                                                
41 Newland and Papademetrious (1998) argue that the “clear and widespread tendency to interpret
obligations more narrowly than heretofore and restrictive practices both here [in the USA] and Europe are
being emulated by developing countries like Thailand, Iran and Tanzania, which feel justified in their
actions because they are less able than the developed nations to handle massive refugee flows.” (644)  (For
evidence of the shift from humanitarian acceptance to rejection, see Ram 1990, Hitchox 1990, Davis 1990.)
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remittances to relatives. This funding may be the greatest source of foreign earnings for a
state recovering from civil war.
Historical Context and Humanitarian Intervention
In addition to the regional and global political and geographical context, the
relationship between the refugee issue and the drawing up and implementation of peace
agreements must be viewed in an historical context. In the aftermath of what was then
called the Great War (WWI), the official solution to a refugee crisis concentrated on
internationally endorsed population exchanges. After World War II with the setting up of
UNHCR and the signing of the Refugee Convention, the solution to refugee issues legally
shifted to one based on refugee status determination for persecuted individuals and
humanitarian action focussed on resettling refugees often rooted in Cold War politics.
The nineties have given birth to a third predominant solution - unsanctioned
population exchanges and temporary protection for masses of refugees - while the
rhetoric endorses multi-ethnic societies. As a consequence, many refugees are left in
limbo. The provisions in the peace agreement do not recognize this reality. They focus on
one solution (putting enormous resources behind minority returns in Bosnia) while not
facilitating the real one available - relocation. This is apparent in the studies of the efforts
to return refugees and displaced peoples to minority areas governed by those who led the
ethnic cleansing in the aftermath of the exclusionary wars won by the ethnic cleansers.
Analyzing case studies of peace agreements and their implementation in
relationship to the refugee and displaced persons issues should reveal how pervasive this
apparent paradox is. Unfortunately the inherent propensity of the conflict situation itself,
the predispositions and skills of those trained to study the conflict and the urgency of
resolving the violent dimensions as quickly as possible, together have a propensity to
marginalize the issue.
The Media
I will speculate. In Kosovo, if Milosovic had not greatly accelerated the rate of
ethnic cleansing already underway before NATO started its bombing campaign, there
would have been a good chance that a large and effective protest movement against the
bombing would have developed. The pictures of wave after wave of fleeing and
distraught masses crossing the borders, destabilizing the local states and carrying with
them tales of atrocities and horrors, provided the passion and support for the bombing
campaign against a sovereign state and the infrastructure that made it operate.
In the Rwanda genocide of the Tutsi, it was not the genocide that instigated an
international response, but the plight of the Hutu refugees at Goma. Refugees provide a
magnet for the media. The plight of the refugees has a powerful effect on whether
western powers become involved. The media coverage also affects how they become
involved and the reaction to that involvement by their publics. I do not recall any of the
case studies taking up the role of the media, especially in relationship to refugees and the
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impact on the peace agreement as well as the possibilities of the implementation of the
terms.
The legal context may stress the rights that refugees possess, but the ability to
exercise those rights may depend more on perception than on any abstract rights. And the
media provide the vehicle for transmitting most of those perceptions.
PART  III – REINTEGRATION OF REFUGEES
If only some peace agreements address the problem of refugee repatriation, and,
as in Bosnia, sometimes in a way that sabotages a permanent resolution to the refugee
problem, not one agreement adequately addressed the problem of refugee reintegration.
The failure to repatriate refugees in a timely fashion may be one factor in the
continuation of a conflict and the failure to implement an agreement. This was evidently
the case in Angola. (Rogge 1994, 27)
In Angola, different groups of refugees acquired different languages, a different
education and received different forms of professional accreditation (Rogge 1994, 42) as
many refugees also became urbanized and educated. Those in Zambia had become
primarily anglophones while those in Zaire had become francophones. The acquisition of
different cultural outlooks reinforced the fact that the different groups of refugees
supported different political movements. (Allen and Morsink 1994, 75-79) Many of the
refugees in Zaire supported the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA).
Their repatriation or reintegration was, thus, not a high priority for the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) which controlled the government.
(Rogge 1994, 27)
      Land was certainly a very important factor in determining whether refugee
repatriation was or was not successful. The failure to provide land to the returnees in
Angola was certainly one of the most important factors in the failure of that repatriation
program. On the other hand, land was a critical aspect, if not the most critical aspect, in
the repatriation of Guatemalan refugees. The government agreed to a mechanism for land
acquisition by the refugee. Between 1993 and 1997, 37,000 refugees returned and were
resettled in their place of origin or on lands purchased on favorable terms with help from
the government. However, only refugee groups that had signed up by December 29, 1997
qualified for those terms.
Similarly, the success of the program of providing land to the returnees in El
Salvador was critical in marking that program a success. Land was a major issue in the
peace process, and transfers to ex-combatants and civilians in FMLN-controlled zones
were a central element of reintegration plans. (Call, 28) It was a complicated process, but
Call quotes the ONUV as reporting that by December 1996 nearly all (98.93%) registered
beneficiaries had received title to their land. The question Call does not answer, and
could not answer because he was not undertaking a comparative study, was whether this
35
success in transferring land was made possible because the vast majority of the refugees
were not repatriated and most were resettled, mainly in the USA. 42
The availability of land, however, is certainly not the only factor promoting
successful reintegration, but it is one important factor. For example, in Cambodia, the
effort of reintegration did not accomplish its goals of either giving the refugees the two
acres of land promised43 or even allowing them to settle where they liked. The refugees
were not repatriated to their homes (Eastmond and Ojendal 1999, 41). However, not
providing land to the refugees may in other cases promote peace. In the Arusha Accords
of Rwanda, the refugees who had left the country more than ten years previously (the vast
bulk left thirty to thirty-five years earlier) were not entitled to reclaim their property. In
this case, this denial of any right to reclaim property eliminated a significant source of
conflict when the Tutsi population repatriated.
In other contexts, other economic policies affect not only the process of
reintegration but the rate and desirability of return. For example, in Lebanon, as Zahar’s
case study makes clear, the economic policies (neo-liberal) were said to favor the rich.
They also contributed to scaring away Lebanese skilled workers and professionals from
repatriating. (30)44
Perversely, in some cases the very process of repatriation undermined the
possibility of successful reintegration because the major economic source for sustaining
the population was cut off.  For example, since the camps in Ethiopia subsidized the
Somali economy, closing or moving of those camps disrupted the Somali economy and
increased the propensity for conflict. (Hogg 1996, 157)
Finally, transfers of funds from other refugees in the diaspora are an important
factor, not only in sustaining factions in the civil war, but in the process of repatriation
and reintegration of refugees following the war. In Somalia, remittances from relatives
were important in sustaining the economy (Hogg 1996, 153). In the Sri Lankan civil war,
refugees in the diaspora were critical sources for remittances that bought both munitions
                                                
42 There are several possible reasons for this. The peace process was not burdened by the costs of
repatriating one million refugees. Further, the competition for land was eased.  Finally, remittances from
relatives who had resettled abroad became an important element in the post-war economic reconstruction.
Call himself notes (p. 62 ) that in the two successive years after the agreement, remittances totaled one
billion US dollars each year. In other words, the irony may be that the El Salvador peace accords were so
successful (at least as one important ingredient) because the overwhelming bulk of refugees were not
repatriated. Remittances were also a factor in rebuilding Lebanon to which most refugees also did not
return. The issue of remittances (as in El Salvador) from refugees who settled abroad should be considered
both in the process of destabilization to finance militias as well as in the economic reconstruction of
Lebanon to finance rebuilding of homes. In fact, remittances replaced the funds lost from trade. (Beyhum
17, 21)
43 It is not clear why the UNHCR did not know that the 2 acres of land could not be available as promised.
There appeared to be no lack of fertile land according to some studies of the process of repatriation.
44 The neo-liberal policies had an even more important effect on the internally displaced. The imposition of
property rights were at odds with encouraging return as the Ministry of the Interior began to execute court
orders to evict 40,000 families illegally occupying properties. (Zahar, 38)
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and propaganda during the war and could be used to reintegrate returning refugees
following the cessation of hostilities.
But there are many other factors that impeded successful reintegration. The first is
the absence of security. It is certainly a factor in the decision to repatriate. Based on their
study of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan, Ask, Knudsen and Suhrke (1993) argue that
political stability is the most important element in fostering refugee repatriation. Glatzer
(1990) argues that neither the cessation of hostilities nor political stability, but rather
physical security, which may be influenced by those other two factors, is the most crucial
element. Thus, local banditry, anarchy, the existence of a local mafia as well as
unexploded ordinance, are key ingredients inhibiting return. Court Robinson (1994)
stresses the importance of both political and physical security. Beyond serving as motives
to repatriation, they are primary factors in the success of reintegration.
In Cambodia, quite aside from the considerable evidence that the process of
repatriation itself was manipulated and that inadequate information was provided to the
refugees on the issue of security (Robinson 1994 ), once the refugees were returned to
Battambang, a Khmer Rouge area, the security goal was not achieved because the
refugees were subjected to intimidation by the SOC. Contrary to widespread belief, the
insecurity was not impeded because of the large number of mines left in the area. This
area was not heavily mined (Eastmond and Ojendal 1999, 95), though Babb and Steuben
(1998, 106) emphasize this factor in the failure of reintegration.
As another illustration of the importance of physical security, in Mozambique,
when Frelimo returned to Milange, the bulk of refugees did not return. But after
EMOCHA invested in recovery and the town was rehabilitated from 1989-91, there was a
larger scale return. As Wilson and Nunes concluded: “Whilst the relief programmes
played an important role in creating the context for this trade, and sustaining a proportion
of the population upon which it could be based, it was above all the military security of
Milange, and its border location, that initially enabled the rise of commerce, just as these
same two factors have most enabled the return of so many refugees.” (211) In other
words, economic recovery and physical security are mutually reinforcing.
The requirement of international organizations to ensure the return of refugees in
safety and dignity also inhibits and retards the involvement of an organization like
UNHCR. For example, in Mozambique, de-mining was specifically not a condition of
repatriation in the peace agreement. (Zieck 373) Yet, UNHCR was to provide the
standard guaranty of orderly return and reintegration in conditions of safety and dignity.
Hence, repatriation was not started by UNHCR until April 1993 since the repatriation
could only commence “when the High Commissioner is satisfied that the refugees can
return in safety and dignity under the circumstances prevailing in Mozambique.”
(UNHCR May 1993, 9) This is another explanation for the high numbers of self-
repatriated versus those who are part of an organized return movement.
A third major problem in reintegration, other than the absence of land and the
persistence of unexploded ordinance and intimidation threatening the physical security of
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the returnees, was the tension between the residents in the area and the repatriated
refugees.45 Fourthly, monies and food rations taken up under Option C were inadequate
to the actual amount needed until the refugees were reestablished because donors did not
contribute enough. (Cf. UNDP 1991 regarding donor pledges vs actual contributions).
Babb and Streuben (1998, 106) stress this factor in particular. The result was lack of
sufficient building materials, seed grains or even food to meet the repatriation
requirements. As a result, many commentators (Eastmond and Ojendal 1999 as well as
Geiger 1994) blame the incapacities of UNHCR, UNDP and the NGOs, though Eastmond
and Ojendal also point to the dependency syndrome that the refugees developed in the
camps (48). Law (1995, 64) believes that the haste of the effort to expedite the
repatriation was at the root of the disorganized effort, resulting in a disproportionate
amount of money spent on repatriation at the cost of reintegration. (Law 1995, 62)
In the case of Namibia, however, there was plenty of time to plan the reintegration
process. Yet the same general pattern of a large gap between the funds needed to run a
proper reintegration program and the funds actually available was evident. The UNHCR
had insufficient funds after a 17 million dollar shortfall in the monies actually available
for its rehabilitation projects. No funds were available for cultural understanding,
educational training and psychological assistance programs. As a consequence, the
international effort to get educated Namibians to return was undermined. Further,
Tapscott and Muloneni (1990) argue that the returnees who did come back were not
happily accommodated by their families. Given the skills of those who did return, they
were still unemployed. Their skills were not recognized and the returnees became
disoriented. Preston (1994) says that returnees were embarrassed at dependency on their
families and depressed by lack of economic opportunities. In the end, only 7% were
employed while 36% were active in subsistence production; the idle took to drink and
crime. (262) It should not be a surprise, then, that of up to 100,000 Namibians expected
to return, only 42,736 refugees went through the official UN return program.
Other factors also played a part. In Cambodia, refugees lacked a social network to
facilitate becoming reestablished. (Eastmond and Ojendal 48) Related to this issue, local
suspicions and rejection (Davenport et al 1995) and local intimidation (cf. the Chrouy
Arpel study of 21 returnees) compounded the problems of the returnees. Even in the
Chrouy Arpel study, where the refugees did receive free land, they lost it. (Hansen 1993)
In other regions, the local residents were much more dependent on the refugees
than the reverse, as was the case elsewhere. In Somalia, there was extensive food sharing
between residents and returnees; wherever Somalis had access to refugee camps, they had
access to food and, hence, were healthier.
                                                
45 After all, the process of repatriation may be part of the conflict. In Guatemala, during the civil war, the
locals had been taught to distrust refugees, and, hence, returnees. “The army apparently warned people in a
village neighbouring the return settlement in Nenton not to mix with the returnees because ‘they bring back
their organization that started the problem’.” (Stepputat 1999, 214) This was in a context where
government supporters were organized into safe enclaves around civil defence strategies. (Gramajo 1995)
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To go back to Cambodia, there seems to be no single cause for the failure of
reintegration of Cambodians.46 But there is a virtually unanimous consensus that it did
fail. Among the myriad possible factors, each played a part, thereby throwing a shadow
over the supposedly successful reintegration process. However, the threat of violence was
reduced and made possible the repatriation process. Nevertheless, the implicit terms of
the agreement regarding refugee return were in spirit, if not always in letter, violated.
The failure of reintegration of refugees has a number of negative consequences.
Foremost amongst them is the production of a body of unemployed youth who easily slip
into criminal activities and, more importantly for our purposes, become a source of
recruits for the resumption of armed conflict. In Sierra Leone, the marginally unemployed
and disaffected youth became a main source of recruits for the warlords who resorted to
armed conflict to take over the government.
This happened in Somalia as well. There, returnees, because of war as well as
drought, drifted into camps. (Gode and Kelefo) In the Eastern Hareghe region, some
refugees spent 14 years in camps. (Holt and Laurence 1991, 145). As a result, the young
people did not acquire the husbandry skills of pastoralists. They began to identify with
urban and sedentary life. Thus, when they returned, they drifted back into towns. In the
absence of a major economic revival, they were added to the urban unemployed and,
therefore, contributed to instability. (Holt and Laurence 1991, 147) In fact, the percent of
returnees who went to the rural areas was only 28.5%. (Holt and Laurence 1991, 147)
Clearly, the failure of reintegration has long-term consequences for the
achievement of positive peace even when there are few repercussions on the general
cessation of organized violent political conflict and the achievement of negative peace.
CONCLUSION
There has been a failure to examine critically widely held assumptions that rr&r
are essential to achieving and maintaining peace. This is certainly the case when refugees
are not repatriated, for there is a real danger of creating refugee warriors. Further, if the
refugees are repatriated but not reintegrated, they may become refugee warriors anyway.
There are a number of reasons why this may be the case. Sometimes, as indicated above,
when the refugees are repatriated but the reintegration of those refugees is not successful,
the result is the creation of a breeding ground for future violence and even recruits for a
new violent uprising. But there are many other cases where it appears that successful rr&r
are not essential to the successful implementation of a peace agreement.
                                                
46 There is one theory that traces all these factors to one root. The Khmer Rouge had agreed to cooperate
based on the promise of refugee repatriation and the prospect of a continuing base of support within
Cambodia. There were forces at work determined to undermine that support. The consequences of the
failure of the refugees to reestablish themselves is that a source of revenue and support for the Khmer
Rouge was taken away. (Reynalt 1989 and Vickery 1990) According to proponents of this thesis ,  the
refugees were intentionally sacrificed to the cause of stability and the decimation and withering away of the
Khmer Rouge.
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On the other hand, the implicit and unexpressed contrary position that refugee
repatriation is a marginal issue in the implementation of most peace agreements has also
not been probed. The conclusion I draw is more surprising than either of the above
positions. Successful refugee repatriation and reintegration, in many cases, may not have
been either central to the success of a peace agreement or marginal to that success.
Contrary to both positions, in many cases the non-repatriation of refugees may have been
central to the success of a peace agreement, such as in El Salvador. It facilitated the
successful repatriation and reintegration of the small proportion of refugees who did
return. As well, the refugees who remained in the diaspora provided a source of
remittances to help rebuild the economy. Could it be the case that the failure of
repatriation was an essential part in securing the cessation of violence?
In some cases, the repatriation of refugees may have, in fact, jeopardized the
possible ‘success’ of a peace agreement, where success is simply defined as the absence
of violence. In an exclusionary war, where refugees attempted to return to their homes,
and not just parts of the homeland, and where the ethnic cleansers were de facto
victorious, the return of the refugees to their homes was a stimulant to the resumption of
violence. This is quite aside from the issue of the justice of that return and the injustice
that is perpetuated by the non-return. The intimidation by the majority against the
minority returnees may be unethical and unacceptable, but, with the exception of Kosovo,
the international community showed no inclination to stop the ethnic cleansing with the
force necessary to accomplish the task. And, in Kosovo, when they did, the effect was to
ensure the repatriation of the refugees first expelled, but only at the cost of the expulsion
of the other ethnic group(s). In other words, in many civil wars there may be an inverse
correlation between the repatriation of refugees and the successful implementation of a
peace agreement defined as the continuation of the cessation of violence. Success cannot
simply be defined as the implementation of the terms of the peace agreement. Put another
way, in some cases, the terms of the agreement may be implemented but there is more
violent conflict. On the other hand, the terms may be effectively ignored, and the result is
short term peace and long term injustice.
If the right of return is insisted upon, at least in the terms of the agreement, but
there is no intention of enforcing that right, then there is no real right of return. There are
merely rhetorical and hypocritical gestures that make a mockery of the whole principle of
rights. More significantly, insisting on certain rights in certain situations, as in the case of
the Palestinian refugees or the refugees from the wars following the break-up of the
former Yugoslavia, means the refugees are left in limbo. They are neither resettled nor
repatriated to their home. The result is the worst of the alternatives available.
This is not just the case in exclusionary wars. In the peace agreements to end both
the Cambodian and Lebanese civil wars, the right of return was included. But in each
case, it effectively meant the opposite. The refugees did not have the right to return to
places of their choice. In Cambodia, they were located where it suited the political
parties, for very different reasons. The effect was that the refugees were moved to an area
where they would support the Khmer Rouge, but were not given the means to reintegrate
so that any support they could render would be useless. In Lebanon, the refugees were
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relocated to areas where they would be homogeneous with the dominant ethnic/religious
group. One begins to suspect that when the ‘right of return’ is articulated in an
agreement, it is a cover for taking away rights to freely locate anywhere in the country.
The phrase, ‘voluntary repatriation’, also seems to have developed into a
rhetorical device to disguise many situations where refugee return is induced or even
coerced. In other situations, as in the case of the Rwandan refugees in Zaire, it is used to
impede a return that might have otherwise taken place. And when returns are truly
voluntary, they often occur outside the terms of the agreement and often before the
conflict has really ended.
Other issues emerged about repatriation that have had very little discussion
previously. A great deal of repatriation is clearly political, aimed at enhancing the support
for one side or another in the electoral battles that are scheduled to ensue following the
cessation of armed battles. In one sense, such a transformation from violent to peaceful
ways of settling conflicts is certainly to be welcomed. On the other hand, it clearly effects
the pace of repatriation, often to the detriment of the refugees. If the goal is to get the
refugees “home” so they can vote, as in Cambodia, the pace may be too fast. If the goal is
to delay the vote, the repatriation may be held up for years as in the Western Sahara. In
either case, the process of repatriation becomes very politicized and, as in Cambodia,
undermines the reintegration process more than usual.
The most important observation, however, is that it is crucial to link refugee
repatriation to the type of war that was fought and who the real winners are. If the ethnic
cleansers remain in de facto power after a war of exclusion, attempting to move refugees
back to their homes in minority areas is a chimera driven by supporters of a multi-ethnic
philosophy who, understandably, do not want to give the ethnic cleansers a post-
genocidal victory. With the exception of the war in Kosovo intended to finally diminish
the military capacity of Milosevic, those intent on putting Humpty Dumpty back together
again have not succeeded in getting the developed countries to put up the military forces
and use them to accomplish such a goal. Further, even as in Kosovo where they do ensure
that the Muslims from Kosovo return, the cost is the ethnic cleansing of Serbs and Roma
from Kosovo. In either case, the idea of a multi-ethnic polity has been destroyed and
refugees result who cannot be repatriated.
There are other factors that have an affect on the support, push for and pace of
refugee repatriation. The most important of these are the policies and actions of
neighboring states hosting the refugees. In some cases, for example, in Sierra Leone, the
very issue of refugee repatriation may be inserted into the peace agreement because of the
interests and pressures of the host state or states.
From an even more distant perspective, the timing of the issue of refugee
repatriation, in relationship to the historical development of acceptable international
norms in dealing with refugees, is clearly very significant. In addition, the role of the
international media in covering such events and the development of the globalized
economy all have an effect on whether and how refugee repatriation is linked to a peace
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agreement in a civil war and its implementation. The most surprising lesson of the study,
however, is that refugee repatriation may sometimes operate to the detriment of positive
peace. The absence of repatriation of the majority of the refugees who become resettled
in countries of asylum may enhance the prospects for peace in both the short and long
term. Furthermore, the prospects for successful reintegration of the refugees who do
repatriate may also be enhanced given the reduction in competition for scarce land, the
increased flow of remittances to assist in the rebuilding effort, etc.
Thus, once the reintegration as well as repatriation factors are thrown into the
equation, the relationships become even more complicated. For example, it seems odd to
learn that the maintenance of refugee camps, hence retarding refugee repatriation, in an
area in which violent conflict has stopped, may be important to sustaining the peace and
preventing the resumption of conflict. For unemployed and disaffected returnees can
resort to arms. Further, the camps may be an important source of economic subsidy in an
area that is struggling to survive simply to obtain the bare minimum for subsistence.
If repatriation of refugees and the sustaining of peace are sometimes at odds
rather than complementary, possibly it is even more surprising to learn that the mode of
refugee repatriation may undermine the prospects for refugee reintegration. More
surprising still, expenditures on repatriation may come at the cost of monies needed for
reintegration, thus endangering the long-term prospects of achieving positive peace.
Returnees are not always welcomed back with open arms by those who remained behind.
Quite aside from possible political differences and suspicions of why some left and others
remained behind, the refugees may have adopted different cultural patterns, acquired new
languages and skills which may threaten the patterns of life of those who remained
behind. Repatriation of refugees may itself be a source of conflict and pose its own
challenge to the prospects for reintegration.
The answer, thus, is somewhat more subtle than simply reversing the correlation
that refugee repatriation (and reintegration) are essential ingredients in the successful
implementation of a peace accord. The issues of repatriation and reintegration are not
marginal either. This paper puts forth the evidence and arguments for challenging the
presumption of humanitarian scholars that successful repatriation and reintegration are
essential to the successful implementation of a peace agreement. At the same time, it also
challenges the possibly implicit assumption of most scholars of conflict studies that the
issue of refugee repatriation may be a marginal factor in the successful implementation of
a peace agreement. Instead, refugee repatriation and reintegration may be complicating
factors, with many different dimensions, in the successful implementation of a peace
agreement.
